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Prospectus Liability and Investor 
Protection in Quebec Law. 
Robert DEMERS* 
Une corporation qui désire obtenir du capital sur le marché public 
doit informer les épargnants de son intention et renseigner ces personnes 
sur la nature et le sérieux de l'entreprise. La décision de participer au 
financement d'une corporation ne se prend qu'après avoir consulté le 
prospectus, le document essentiel d'une telle démarche. 
Pour assurer le succès d'une telle sollicitation financière, les pro-
moteurs ont parfois exagéré la situation réelle de la compagnie et n'ont 
pas hésité à faire de fausses représentations sur la santé économique de 
leurs entreprises. L'incidence de la fraude et de la négligence à ce stade 
du financement public a donc donné lieu à une jurisprudence abondante 
dans la Province et à des législations spéciales. 
Cet article étudie, à la lumière de notre droit provincial, cet aspect 
bien particulier du droit corporatif tout en examinant de façon incidente 
l'approche de nos tribunaux et du Législateur au problème de préserver 
dans leur intégrité les règles du droit civil québécois face à l'assaut 
séculaire de la common law. 
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« ...l'on voit qu'il y a ici un écart entre la 
conception anglo-canadienne et franco-
québécoise... » 
M. Giguère, Les devoirs des dirigeants 
de sociétés par actions, P.U.L., Québec, 
1967, at p. 173. 
One area of company law in which very little research has been 
carried out in Canada is prospectus liability. Of late, many of the pro-
blems dealing with the more technical aspects of issuing a prospectus 
have been examined in great detail in common and civil law jurisdictions1 
but no important contribution has appeared on the legal implications of 
fraud and negligence in the preparation of such documents. In Quebec, 
this problem takes on a peculiar dimension: not only must the courts deal 
with various statutory enactments essentially inspired from the common 
law tradition but they must also understand such mechanisms in function 
of civil law principles. The result is a curious mixture of both common 
and civil law and a considerable confusion2 in deciding which jurisdiction 
1. For common law provinces: R. C. Meech, "Prospectus and registration require-
ments", [1968] L.S.U.C. 211. For Quebec: Y. Renaud et J. Smith, Droit québécois des 
corporations commerciales, vol. 2, Judico Inc., Montreal, 1974, at pp. 1186 and follow-
ing. An interesting discussion of prospectus liability from the underwriter's point of 
view can be found in P. P. Côté, "The underwriters civil liability and investor 
protection", (1975) 10 R.J.T. 137. 
2. Professor Gower himself points to the rather confusing nature of this problem in 
English law: The principles of modern company law, 3rd ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 
1969, at p. 295. 
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to follow. The problems of prospectus liability in Quebec to this day 
remain a mystery: the decisions of the courts on this aspect of the law 
have never been properly analysed, the statutes contain surprising ele-
ments of non-conformity to standard national models and the authors, in 
general, avoid touching upon the issue. It is hoped that this article will fill 
in this important gap in Quebec company law whilst studying at the same 
time the reactions of both the courts and the provincial Legislator to this 
intriguing problem. 
PART I 
Civil law remedies for mis-statements in the preparation of a prospectus in 
Quebec company law. 
The main purpose of a prospectus is "to call the attention of the 
public"3 to the company in order that they be interested in investing in the 
capital ofthat body4. Obviously, when one tries to convince a third party 
to participate in any joint-venture, one tries to publicize the more interest-
ing aspects ofthat particular enterprise, minimizing the negative points in 
favour of the convincing sides of the affair. In the case of public finance, 
this raises great difficulties because promoters and directors will some-
times try to obtain capital at all costs. It was the particular incidence of 
fraud and negligence at this stage of company organization that caused the 
enactment of the many statutory amendments now lumbering most mod-
ern Companies Acts and as will be seen later on, Quebec is no exception 
to the rule. 
In the interpretation of such statutes and of simple cases of fraud and 
negligence, it thus becomes exceedingly important in Quebec to decide 
whether common or civil law principles should apply. This is a crucial 
point in the discussion of this problem for the determination of the appli-
cable rules will have important consequences on the rights of all parties 
involved. 
As far as statutes are concerned, the rule of interpretation is a clear 
one: all statutes in Quebec are governed by the general principles of the 
Civil Code, and the Court of Appeal has indicated that the corporate laws 
are no exception to this principle5. As for ordinary cases of fraud and negli-
3. French Gas Saving Co. v. The Desbarats Advertising Agency Ltd., [1912] 1 D.L.R. 
136 (Q.B.) at p. 145 per Archer, J., in the Superior Court. 
4. Cox & Paton v. The Queen, (1963) 40 C.R. 52 (S.C.C.) at p. 74. 
5. Darveau v. D'Amours, (1933) 54 Que. K.B. 481 at pp. 493-494per Létourneau, J., 
diss, on another issue. Unless of course the particular statute is excepted from its 
application. A good example is the Special corporate powers Act, R.S.Q. 1964, c. 275, 
articles 22 and following. 
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gence, it seems quite evident that the rules of civil law should apply: 
Quebec courts have readily admitted that contracts to take up shares in a 
company fall under the general rules of the Civil Code and that they are 
subjected to the same regulation as other contracts. As pointed out by 
Rivard, J., in La Cie rurale de lumière électrique v. Cauchon6: 
"Les règles ordinaires du droit civil doivent s'appliquer chez nous, à ces sortes 
de contrats. . ." ' . 
Thus, questions of fraud and negligence are essentially to be dealt 
with by the rules of civil law and the courts, consistent with their own 
views, have admitted French law as authority on this question8. 
The influence of English law, however, was to be felt even in this 
sphere of company law: some courts took the unusual view that English 
rules should prevail over those of civil law in questions relating to 
fraudulent statements in connection with the issue of shares9 and much 
confusion results from this approach in Quebec law today10. 
As a general rule, the most common form of relief suggested by the 
cases and commentators for mis-statements in a prospectus is an action in 
damages against the persons making the statements and in some cases, 
6. (1924) 35 Que. K.B. 532. 
7. Ibid., at p. 536. See also Allard, J., diss., at p. 539 agreeing on this point. Also: Boulet 
v. Hudon, (1917) 51 Que. S.C. 29(C.R.), at p. yi;Arless v. The Belmont Manufactur-
ing Co., (1885) 1 M.L.R. 340 (Q.B.) at p. 344; La Banque d'Hochelaga v. Garth, 
(1886) 2 M.L.R. 201 (S.C.) at p. 210. 
8. Cloutier v.Dion, [1954] Que. Q.B. 595 at p. 603 where Prattte J., ,efers to the following 
case: S. 1882.1.311; see also Bergeron v. La Cie. de meubles de Jonquière, (1913) 22 
Que. K.B. 341 at pp. 351-352. The tendency of accepting French authorities has 
always been indicative in this field of commercial law of the basically civilian nature of 
many of the problems involved. In Young v. McNider, (1895) 25 S.C.R. 272, Tas-
chereau, J., dealt with this issue at pp. 282-284. 
9. Robert v. The Montreal Trust Co., (1917) 56 S.C.R. 342per Anglin, J., at pp. 363-364 
where the judge argued that the rules of civil law concerning prescription of rights result-
ing from a fraudulent act should be governed by the principles of common law in the field 
of corporate frauds for the sake of creating harmony on this question in Canada. See also 
ibid., at pp. 362-363. In fact, what the judge is saying is that whatever civil law decides in 
such cases should give way to common law, a view that has not been without serious 
critics even of late. See: J. L. Baudouin, « L'interprétation du Code civil québécois par 
la Cour suprême du Canada »,(1975)53 C.B.R. 715 and more precisely at p. 722 n. 23. 
Also: Rhodes v. Starnes,( 1878) 22 L.C.J. 113 (S.C.) at pp. .16-118,120-121 where John-
son, J., refers to various authorities of English law. 
10. Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol.11 at p. 1135. It is not surprising to see how deeply felt 
was to be the influence of English law in this sphere when one considers that it even 
had an impact on French law: J. Hémard, F. Terré et P. Mabilat, Sociétés commer-
ciales, vol. 1, Librairie Dalloz, Paris, 1972, at p. 587, n. 638. 
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the nullity of the subscription contract. Damages can be asked for in cases 
where there has been a fraudulent or a negligent statement and even 
where there has been a promise that has been inexecuted. These various 
points will be studied separately in order to underline more clearly the 
rules of civil law applicable to each case and the inconsistencies of import-
ing rules of common law on such questions. 
A. FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS IN A PROSPECTUS 
1. Fraud in a civil law context: definition 
It is not easy to give a general definition of fraud that will cover every 
possible case" but a fraudulent act or statement, in Quebec, could be 
described as follows: 
". . .le fait de provoquer volontairement une erreur dans l'esprit d'autrui pour le 
pousser à contracter. . ." '2 . 
In a prospectus, fraudulent statements usually fall into two 
categories : omissions and false representations. 
Omissions, at common law, do not give rise to liability, unless they 
amount to a suggestio falsili. This is the rule in England and in the 
common law provinces of Canada14. In Quebec, a similar position is 
adopted. A simple omission is not constitutive of fraud at civil lawls: 
there are two important exceptions to this principle, one of them being 
that partial disclosure of facts can amount to fraud16 and contracts where 
uberrima fides is involved16. A good illustration of the first exception in 
Quebec is Chrétien v. Crowley17. In that case, an agent sold shars in a 
11. G. Trudel, Traité de droit civil du Québec, vol. 7, Wilson et Lafleur, Montréal, 1946, 
at p. 180. 
12. J. L. Baudouin, Les Obligations, P.U.M., Montréal, 1970, at p. 77, n. 125. 
13. Some of the older authorities suggest that there was a wider duty of disclosure at 
common law: A. Stiebel, Company law and precedents, vol. 1, 3"1. ed., Sweet & 
Maxwell Ltd., London, 1929, at p. 145, n. (t); F. W. Wegenast, The law of Canadian 
companies, Burroughs & Co., Toronto, 1931 at p. 717; but the rule came to be settled 
that only omissions amounting to fraud would be valid: Stiebel, ibid., at p. 145; 
Wegenast, ibid., at pp. 717-718. See, generally, A. Stiebel, "Inferences from a pros-
pectus", (1932) 48 L.Q.R. 43. 
14. Wegenast, op. cit., at pp. 717-718. 
15. BAUDOUIN,op. cit., at pp. 78-79, par. l27;Dupaul.. VarylandInvestments Co., (1923) 
35 Que. K.B. 328 at p. 332; Rhodes v. Starnes, (1878) 22 L.C.J. 113 (S.C.) at pp. 
119-120. 
16. Baudouin, ibid. 
17. (1882) 2 Dorion C.A. 385 (Q.B.). 
750 Les Cahiers de Droit 18 C. de D7 745 
unincorporated company18. The shares were quoted on the Stock Ex-
change but their quotation had been fraudulently altered by illegal 
dealings19. Defendant agreed to take up shares in the company but plain-
tiff omitted to tell him that the company had no charter and that the true 
value of the shares had been changed by artificial dealings on the Ex-
change: the Court of Appeal held that these omissions were sufficient to 
avoid the contract20 remarking that defendant "would not have con-
tracted as he did"21 if he had known all of the facts. 
The other exception to the rule of civil law is contracts uberrimae 
fidei22. One wonders if contracts to take up shares in a company do not 
actually fall under such a category: the extensive regulation by the Secu-
rities Act23 of the information that must be set out in a prospectus 
covers material omissions24 and it would appear that this statutory regula-
tion has altered the nature of such agreements. A plaintiff could argue that 
a simple omission in a prospectus now amounts to fraud because of the 
very peculiar nature of his contract. 
False statements, in this context, are more common. A false state-
ment is the affirmation of an untrue fact in order to induce a third party to 
contract25. In Quebec, false statements in prospectus cover all types of 
information. The most common examples to be found in the jurispru-
dence are that certain persons have agreed to become shareholders or 
18. The Silver Plume Mining Co. 
19. Supra n. 17 at pp. 388-389, 392-397. 
20. Ibid., at pp. 389, 391 and 396-397. 
21. Ibid., at p. 392 per Ramsay, J. See also Rhodes v. Starnes, supra n. 15, at p . 115; 
Trudel, op. cit., at p. 183. Dorchester Electric Co. v. Thompson, (1915) 48 Que. S.C. 
471; 48 R. de J. 27 (S.C.) at pp. 29-31 for another case possibly explained by this 
approach; Hardy v. Dallaire, (1923) 63 Que. S.C. 83. See also Côté, loc. cit., n. 1, at 
pp. 144-145. 
22. Supra n. 16. Note that at common law, contracts for shares were not considered as 
such: Stiebel, op. cit., vol. I at p. 145; Wegenast, op. cit., at pp. 717-718. Such 
contracts were not uberrimae fidei but rather the maxim caveat emptor was more 
applicable to such cases: A. Stiebel, in (1932) 48 L.Q.R. 43 at p. 43. 
23. R.S.Q. 1964, c. 274. (Hereinafter referred to as the Securities Act.) 
24. See G. C. Cheshire and C. H. S. Fifoot, The law of contract, Butterworths, London, 
1972 at p. 277. 
25. Baudouin, op. cit., at p . 79 n. 128. Note however that where the statement becomes 
false by the fault of a third party, the company cannot be liable in fraud. Thus, where a 
company represents that a city council has offered a considerable bonus and the city 
then refuses to honor its promise, the company cannot be liable for the consequence 
because it honestly believed the statement to be true: La Cie. des cercueils en verre v. 
Doyon, (1923) 29 R.L. n.s. 288 (S.C.) at pp. 289-290. 
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directors of the company when this in fact is not true26 or that the com-
pany is organised27, that the capital is paid-up to a certain amount28 or 
that a charter has been applied for29. It is of course the falsity of the 
statement that causes it to become fraudulent and this entails an impor-
tant consequence. Simple exaggerations of fact do not constitute, in civil 
law, a fraudulent statement: what the civil law generally describes as 
dolus bonus has never been sufficient, in this context, to avoid a contract to 
take up shares30. 
But the falsity of a statement, and the same rule is found in English 
law31, is not sufficient to qualify as a fraud if the party who claims to have 
been victim of the statement has not in fact relied thereon. A false state-
ment in a prospectus will give rise to liability in damages only where in 
fact it has induced the plaintiff to contract: as pointed out by Curran, J., in 
Bonhomme v. Bickerdike32, the locus classicus of Quebec law on this 
subject, 
" . . . plaintiff has established that he did not see the prospectus complained of in 
this cause until after he and his brother had secured their interview. . . and that 
26. Leroy v. J. A. Davis and Co. Ltd.. (1919) 55 Que. S.C. 497 (CR.) at pp. 499-500; 
Bergeron v. La Cie de meubles de Jonquière, supra note 8 at pp. 347-348 where Cross, 
J., distinguishes between the case where there is a clear representation and a mere 
possibility; Duquenne v. La Cie. générale des boissons canadiennes, (1907) 31 Que. 
S.C. 409(C.R.) at pp. 415-416; Bonhomme v. Bickerdike, (1899) 17 Que. S.C. 28(C.R.) 
at pp. 46-47. Note that where a person is falsely represented as a shareholder in a 
petition for incorporation, he can obtain the nullity of the charter by scire facias: La 
Banque d'Hochelaga v. Murray, (1890) 15 A.C. 414 (P.C.) at pp. 427-428. For the 
position of English law: J. Gross, Company promoters, Tel-Aviv University Press, 
Tel-Aviv, 1972, at pp. 49-51; representations as to patronage by "eminent or opulent 
persons" have always been prohibited by statute in England. See Joint-Stock Com-
panies Act ( 1844) 7-8 Vict. c. 110, s. 65 and more recently, Companies Act, 1948, ,s 43 
(4). In French law, see: Giguère, op. cit., at p. 166. 
27. Bonhomme v. Bickerdike, ibid., at pp. 47-48. 
28. Rhodes v. Starnes, supra n. 15 at p. 114. 
29. Bonhomme v. Bickerdike, supra, n. 26 at p. 33. 
30. Dupaul v. Varyland Investment Co., supra n. 15 at p. 329 and authorities cited on 
what is also known as gratis dicta; Caverhill v. Burland, (1888) 4 ML.R. 169(S.C.) at 
pp. 173-174: " . . . A purchaser is expected to be on his guard against what in the 
United States courts, has acquired the half contemptuous term of'dealers' talk'. . ." 
Generally, vide Beaudoin, op. cit., p. 80 n. 130. The same rule prevails in French 
company law: Hémard, Terré et al., op. cit., vol. I at p. 601 n. 665; J. Escarra, E. 
Escarra et J. Rault, Traité théorique et pratique de droit commercial, vol. 2, Recueil 
Sirey, Paris, 1951, at p. 110 n. 601. 
31. Gower, op. cit., at p. 321. 
32. Supra n. 26. 
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in so far as plaintiff is concerned the said prospectus did not and could not have 
in any way misled him. . ."33. 
A fraudulent statement in a prospectus is governed, in Quebec, by 
the general principles applicable to fraud in civil law: the fact that civil 
and common law seem to coincide in the formulation of those special 
rules is no argument in favour of the application of common law autho-
rities to what is a simple case of fraud in a corporate context. 
2. Remedies at civil law for fraudulent statements in a prospectus. 
Fraud, in civil law, gives rise to two remedies: nullity of contract and 
damages34. As pointed out by Cross, J., in Bergeron v. La Cie. de meu-
bles de JonquiereiS, " . . . fraud vitiates everything"36 and this is a rule 
applicable even more so to misrepresentations in a prospectus. The two 
remedies will be examined separately. 
a. Damages 
In civil law, a fraudulent act or statement is a delict falling under the 
general principles of article 1053 C.c. Beaudoin tells us that: 
" . . .le dol, étant un délit, donne ouverture à une action en dommages basée sur 
l'article 1053 C e . . . " " . 
Consequently, any fraud committed in a prospectus will give rise to 
delictual liability under the general principles of the Code. The jurispru-
dence, as we shall see, has followed the rules of civil law in the majority of 
33. Ibid., at p. 38. Also at pp. 33, 49 and 57-58. Note that the judgment of the Court of 
Review was affirmed in appeal on the 24 April 1900 (unreported). See also: Rhodes y 
Starnes, supra n. 15 at pp. 114-115, 121, 122; Carverhill v. Burland, supra n. 30 at 
pp. 174-175; Préfontaine v. Grenier, (1906) 15 Que. K.B. 563 (P.C.) at pp. 568-569; 
Robert v. The Montreal Trust Co., supra n. 9 at pp. 354-355; La Cie. des cercueils en 
verre v. Doyon, supra n. 25 at p. 289. Note in this last case, Rinfret, J's opinion that 
where a party has agreed in writing that only the representations in the prospectus 
have induced him to contract, he cannot rely on any other fraudulent statement to 
obtain relief: ibid., at p. 290; Yuksel Atillasoy v. Crown Trust Co., [1974] C.A. 442, at 
p. 444; Giguère, op. cit., at pp. 171-172; Côté, loc. cit., n. (1), at pp. 143-144. On the 
general rules of civil law applicable in Quebec, see Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 80 n.131. 
In French company law, one finds the same position: Escarra et Rault, op. cit., 
vol. II at p. 11, n. 601; Hémard, Terré et al., op. cit., vol. I at p. 601, n. 665. 
34. Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 82 n. 134, and generally, at pp. 82-83 where the author 
examines the traditional authorities of French and Quebec law on this point. 
35. Supra n. 8. 
36. Ibid., at p. 346, an evident paraphrase of the Latin maxim/rous omnia corrumpit. 
Yl. Beaudoin, op. cit., at p. 83 n. 136; Trudel, op. cit., at p. 184; Pinkus Construction 
Inc. v. McRobert, [1968] Que. Q.B. 516. 
752 
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cases. However, certain exceptions appear here and there, invoking prin-
ciples derived from English law: some amount of criticism will be devoted 
to showing the incompatibility of such cases with the economy of civil law 
responsibility. In an action for damages, the two main questions of impor-
tance are to know who is liable and who can be plaintiff. 
i. Who is liable? 
Article 1053 C.c. reads as follows: 
"Every person capable of discerning right from wrong is responsible for the 
damage caused by his fault to another, whether by positive act, imprudence, 
neglect or want of skill." 
If one applies this rule to a prospectus situation, one could say that 
any person who has participated in any degree to a fraud committed in a 
prospectus is liable for the resulting damages. The jurisprudence agrees 
with the above proposition. In Bonhomme v. Bickerdike38, the first case 
to deal with prospectus liability under Quebec law with any degree of 
attention, the Court gave an authoritative judgment on this point. The 
facts of the case were quite simple: defendant was a promoter of the 
company and had read, corrected and consented to the issuance of a 
misleading prospectus to the public39. The Court held that where a person 
knowingly participates in the publication of such a false document and 
allows it to circulate in the public, that person is liable for any resulting 
damages: 
"A prospectus was drawn up and submitted to defendant, who, having made 
some slight alterations in its wording, approved of it and consented to its being 
issued in the form above recited. Beyond doubt defendant was responsible for 
the issuing of the prospectus and for the truth or falsity of its contents. . ."40. 
As a rule, a fraudulent statement always brings about the personal 
liability of the person making it: in contracts for the sale of shares, where 
a director falsely represents to a purchaser any particular fact, he is liable 
in damages to that person41 and cannot invoke the rules of mandate to 
38. Supra n. 26. 
39. The prospectus contained many false assertions: that there was a provisional organiza-
tion, that certain persons has agreed to become shareholders, ibid., at pp. 46-48; that a 
charter had been applied for, p. 33. Defendant was well aware that those representa-
tions were false: per Cimon, J., at p. 49 of the judgment. 
40. Ibid., at pp. 32-33, per Curran, J. Also, see pp. 49, 57-58. 
41. Cafo Ltd. v. Harper, [1968] Que. S.C. 236, at pp. 239-240, recently affirmed by the 
Court of Appeal in the Yuksel Atillasoy case, supra n. 33 at p. 448; Cloutier v. Dion, 
supra n. 8 at pp. 602-603 per Gagné, J., and at p. 603 per Pratte, J-, where the 
learned judge refers to French law on this point: S. 1882.1.311. Lefebvre v. Prouty, 
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avoid this responsibility42 or a statutory liability that would somehow 
relieve him from the ordinary rules of civil law43—this last point now 
being well settled that statutory liability never excludes the ordinary civil 
law rules unless clearly intended as such44. 
In Quebec, a rather simple rule thus evolves from this straightfor-
ward jurisprudence: every person, whether he be a promoter, an accoun-
tant or a company director, is liable for a false statement knowingly made 
in a prospectus under the general delictual principle of article 1053 C.c.45, 
unless of course he has not made such statement, the onus of proof being 
on the plaintiff to establish mala fides46. 
(1918) 54 Que. S.C. 490 at pp. 497-498; Rhodes v. Starnes, supra n. 15 at pp. 113-114 
where Johnson, J., remarked that: " . . . as a general proposition, and under certain 
circumstances, it may be at once admitted that an action against directors might lie for 
an injury done to an individual by inducing him by false representations to purchase 
stock. There are numerous and well known decisions to that effect. . . Then we 
have. . . our Civil Code establishing a general principle of liability"; Préfontaine v. 
Grenier, ( 1905) 27 Que. S.C. 307 (C.R.) at p. 320 although this case was to be reversed 
by the Privy Council on different grounds: (1906) 15 Que. K.B. 563 (P.C.) 
42. Cafo Ltd. v. Harper, [1968] Que. S.C. 236, at pp. .29-2400 Thii view has been recently 
confirmed by the Court of Appeal in the unreported judgment of: Nadeau et Viau v. 
Restaurant Pierre et Paul Inc. et al., CA., Montréal, n. 14402, 11 February 1975. 
43. Ibid. This now overrules the position taken in Rhodes v. Starnes, supra n. 15 at pp. 
118-119, 120-121. In French company law, the same position is accepted: a statutory 
liability does not avoid the common law liability. See Escarra et Rault, op. cit., vol. II, 
at p. 110. 
44. The most important consequence in this respect is that if a person is liable under 
special statutory provisions like the Securities Act, he cannot invoke this liability to 
escape from the application of the general principle of article 1053 C.c: Yuksel Atil-
lasoy case, supra n. 33, at pp. 447-448. 
45. Giguère, op. cit., at p. 170: 
"Civilement, les cadres généraux de la responsabilité peuvent. . . se refuser à toute 
restriction. On ne saurait par exemple, en droit français et québécois, établir exhaus-
tivement le nombre de ceux qui y sont sujets sur la seule indication de preuves 
documentaires. . ." 
See also: Smith et Renaud, op. cit., vol. 3, at pp. 1428-1437. 
46. Thus, in Cloutier v. Dion, supra n. 8, the secretary of the company was not liable for 
a fraudulent statement because there was no proof that he actually made it. Ibid., at 
pp. 605-606. See also Lefebvre v. Prouty, supra n. 41. On the question of proving 
fraud in civil law, oral evidence is admissible: Bergeron v. La Cie. de meubles de 
Jonquière, supra n. 8 at p. 352; La Cie, de meubles de Robertsonville v. Bilodeau, 
(1914) 46 Que. S.C. 5 (C.R.) at p. 7. Fraud must be corroborated by some evidence: 
Faubert v. Poirier, [1959] S.C.R. 459, approved in Giguere v. Bourque, [1973] Que. 
C.A. 663 at p. 666; Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 73 n. 115. The courts will look to all the 
circumstances to decide this point: Amyot v. The Dominion Cotton Mills Ltd., (1909) 
36 Que. S.C. 35 at p. 52. 
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If the prospectus was issued by a group of persons and where plaintiff 
can establish that each person knew of the falsity of the contents, there 
results a joint and several liability on the part of the directors or promot-
ers: this rule is not particular to fraud in prospectuses, although applicable 
to such cases47 for it is based on the general principle stated at article 1106 
C.c.48. 
In Quebec, every person who participates in a fraud in a prospectus 
is thus liable in damages under the principle established by article 1053 
C.c; in English law, every person who makes a fraudulent statement is 
liable for damages in an action for deceit49 but although there is some 
similarity between the basis of the right to damages in both jurisdictions50, 
it becomes obvious that common law principles cannot apply to what is in 
fact a pure question of civil law. 
A rather more interesting and complicated question is the one of 
knowing whether the company can also be liable for false statements 
made in a prospectus. In such cases, the first condition for such a liability 
to arise is an obvious one: the company cannot answer for documents that 
it did not issue51. This introduces an important distinction: if a prospectus 
purports to be issued by the company, one has to decide to what extent 
the representatives of a company can actually bind it for their faulty act. 
Directors and other mandataries: 
In Quebec company law, a director is the mandatary of the com-
pany52. As a consequence, the rules of mandate set out in the Civil Code 
47. Nadeau et Viau v. Restaurant Pierre et Paul Inc. et al., supra n. 42. See also: 
Lefebvre v. Prouty, supra n. 41 at pp. 497-498. 
48. J. L. Baudouin, IM responsabilité civile délictuelle, P.U.M., Montréal 1973, at 
pp. 161-162, par. 230-231. 
49. Wegenast, op. cit., at p. 725; C. M. Schmitthoff, Palmer's Company Law, vol. I, 22nd 
ed., Stevens & Sons, London, 1976, at p. 197; W. K. Fraser and J. L. Stewart, 
Company law of Canada, 5th ed., Carswell, Toronto, 1962, at p. 498. 
50. Giguère, op. cit., at p. 171. 
51. Forget v. The Cement Products of Canada, (1915) 24 Que. K..B. 445, at p. 447. 
52. See: Upton v. Hutchison, (1898) 8 Que. Q.B. 505; Beckow v. Panich, (1940) 69 Que. 
K.B. 389, at pp. 404-405. This question has been the object of considerable debate 
between legal commentators in Quebec. However, it seems to be settled in favour of 
mandate rules since recent authoritative work in this field: J. Smith, Duties and powers 
of corporate executives and promoters in Quebec with particular reference to the 
interaction of civil law and common law, thesis, University of London, London, 1972. 
See also: J. Smith, "Le statut juridique de l'administrateur et de l'officier au Québec", 
(1973) 75 R. du N. 530 and 609. Recently, the Superior Court has also favoured 
Professor Smith's views: Crevier v. Paquin, [1975] Que. S.C. 260, at p. 263. 
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in the title of Mandate" govern the relationship between the company 
and its directors or other representatives54 and in certain cases, between 
the company and third partiesss. 
As a rule, the mandatory is liable in civil law for the delictual acts of 
his mandatary: this is the rule of article 1731 C.c., which is a mere varia-
tion in the context of this particular relationship of the more general 
principle of liability set out in article 1054 C.c. which reads as follows: 
"1054. He is responsible not only for the damage caused by his own fault, but 
also for that caused by the fault of persons under his control. . . Masters and 
employers are responsible for the damage caused by their servants and workmen 
in the performance of the work for which they are employed"56. 
This rule is applicable to all delicts: where a director or other man-
datary of a company commits a fraudulent statement in a prospectus, the 
logical conclusion should be that he is liable for this delict under the 
general principle of article 1053 C.c. and that the company is also liable 
under article 1731 C.c. 
There is no case dealing with this question in a prospectus context in 
Quebec law: however, a few decisions of the courts have readily admitted 
that a fraudulent representation made by the legal mandatary of a com-
pany binds the company under the rules of civil law. Thus, for example, 
in Ward v. The Montreal Cold Storage and Freezing Co.57, directors of a 
company had issued false warehouse receipts and the company in that 
case was help liable for the fraud of its agents in pursuance of the general 
53. Articles 1701-1761 C.c. 
54. Articles 1720-1726 C.c. 
55. Articles 1727-1731 C.c; J. Smith, "The protection of third parties contracting with 
companies in Quebec", (1974) 52 C.B.R. 1 at pp. 2-9. 
56. Although article 1731 C.c. extended the application of the principle of article 1054 C.c. 
to mandate, it innovated in this respect. Such a rule is unknown in French law: 
Baudouin, La responsabilité civile délictuelle, at p. 231, par. 346; British American Oii 
Co. Ltd. v.Roberge, [1964] Que. Q.B. 18 at p. 28. This judgment was confirmed by the 
Supreme Court of Canada on 9 July 1964. Actually, the rule comes not from civil law 
but strangely enough from common law authorities. Smith tells us that the rule was 
drafted according to English authorities and that the Commissioners preferred to fol-
low such opinions as opposed to Pothier's more restrictive views: ibid., at p. 8 n. 37. 
The rule in English law is of course the same one. A company is liable for the fraud of 
its agents: R. R. Pennington, Company law, 3rd ed., Butterworths, London, 1973, at p. 
242; Gower, op. cit., at pp. 317-318. Thus, it is not surprising to find a remarkable 
similarity in this respect between English and Quebec law, both jurisdictions having 
applied the same rule. However, although the rule of common law was adopted in the 
Civil Code, it should be that body of laws that is now applicable to the question and not 
English authorities. 
57. (1904) 26 Que. S.C. 310 (C.R.). For a comment on that case: (1901) 7 R.L. n.s. 537. 
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principles examined aboveS8. As a rule, the majority of cases have de-
clared the company liable by following authorities of civil law59 although 
the same result was obtained in one case where common law principles 
were applied60. A prospectus issued by a company containing false state-
ments thus imposes upon the company a responsibility for the truth of 
such statements61: the rule in this respect is the same in England and 
Quebec62. It is, however, important to stress the fact that where in En-
gland the vicarious liability of the principal is established according to the 
general rules of agency, in Quebec the rules of mandate govern 
the issue. The fact that article 1731 C.c. was partly inspired from English 
authorities is not a sufficient argument to set aside the rules of civil law, 
which should prevail, as established previously, in the Province63. 
Promoters and unauthorized representatives. 
If the company is to be bound by the act of its mandataries, it cannot 
be liable for the illegalities committed by third parties: in this context, 
fraudulent misrepresentations on the part of promoters are probably the 
best illustration of the rule. 
A fraudulent representation by a promoter will not bind the com-
pany: he has no authority to represent it and the only person answerable 
for his fraud is himself. This point was established clearly in the Court of 
Appeal decision of Bergeron v. La Cie des meubles de Jonquière64, 
58. Ibid., at pp. 338-340, where the Court applied articles 1731 and 1054 C.c. For an 
interesting discussion of the vicarious liability of a company under article 1731 C.c, 
see Smith et Renaud, op. cit., vol. I at pp. 384-387 and the cases therein examined. 
59. Banque provinciale du Canada v. Banque canadienne nationale, [ 1969] Que. S.C. 476; 
Sévigny v. Provincial Improvement Corporation Ltd., (1934) 72 Que. S.C. 5; 
Lamarche v. Beaver Stove Machinery Co., (1916) 23 R.L. n.s. 104 (C.R.) at pp. 
107-108, 110; Compagnie de meubles de Robertsonville v. Bilodeau, (1914) 46 Que. 
S.C. 5 (C.R.) at p. 7; Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II, at pp. 665-666; Baudouin, La 
responsabilité civile délictuelle, at pp. 35, par. 40 and 41 and p. 231, par. 346; Trudel, 
op. cit., at p. 184. 
60. Rhodes v.Starnes, supra n. 15, at pp. 116-117. 
61. But there are limits to this responsibility: if the mandatary of the company makes a 
fraudulent representation contrary to the clear terms of the prospectus, then the plain-
tiff cannot invoke such a statement against the company. The representative's author-
ity was clearly set out in the prospectus and he has no authority, as a rule, implicit or 
apparent, to alter it: Forget v. Cement Products Company of Canada, (1916) 28 
D.L.R. 717 (P.C.) at p. 721. 
62. Supra, n. 56. 
63. Supra, n. 7. 
64. Supra, n. 8. For an older case on the same principle: Connecticut and Passumpsic 
Rivers RR. Co. v. Comstock, (1870) 20 R.J.R.Q. 392 (Q.B.) at p. 406. 
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where Cross, J., made copious references to English law on this ques-
tion65 . 
However, the rule admits of certain exceptions. Firstly, in Duquenne 
v. La Cie. générale des boissons canadienne66, St-Pierre, J., pointed out, 
in an obiter dictum, that where one acts as a pre-incorporation trustee for 
a company to be formed, then the representations of such a trustee might 
bind the company in futurum: 
"Il ne faut pas oublier qu'en donnant aux souscripteurs l'assurance que plus tard 
il deviendrait le directeur-gérant de la compagnie, Duquenne agissait comme le 
fidéicommissaire de la compagnie en voie de formation et que c'était au nom de 
cette compagnie, qu'il faisait au public la représentation que je trouve consignée 
dans le "Projet de Constitution". Or, cette représentation, faite ainsi au nom de 
la future compagnie, dont Duquenne s'était constitué le fidéicommissaire, faisait 
bien naître un droit en faveur des souscripteurs. . ."67. 
The pre-incorporation trustee can validly bind the company to third 
parties by contracts entered into in pursuance of a pre-incorporation trust 
created under section 29 of the Companies Act6*. If he has this power of 
representation, it is submitted that he also has the power to bind the 
company by his illegal conduct and more precisely, by misrepresentations 
in a prospectus69. 
65. Ibid.,app.. 349-351. The judge referred to, in ter alia, Buckley, On Companies, 9th ed. 
at pp. 49, 90; Palmer, Company Law, 9th ed. at p. 102; Hamilton and Parker(Can. ed.) 
at p. 141 and various decisions of the English courts and our own provincial tribunals. 
The company is not liable but as pointed out by Cross, J., in the same case, referring to 
Derry v. Peek, (1889) 14 A.C. 337, the plaintiffs recourse in such a case is against the 
promoters personally: Bergeron case, ibid., at pp. 350-351. See also, Gross, op. cit., 
at p. 157. The Courts have consistently held that the fraudulent representation of a 
promoter gives no right against the company: Dupaul v. Varyland Investment Co., 
(1923) 35 Que. K.B. 328 at p. 331 per Archibald, J., in the Court of Review; note that 
the decision of the Court of Appeal confirmed the Court of Review's judgment without 
expressly passing on this issue. Skelton v. Frigon, (1923) 35 Que. K.B. 11 is also a 
good illustration of the promoter's personal liability on the contract when a fraudulent 
statement is made. See also, generally, Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II, at pp. 
666-668. 
66. (1907) 31 Que. S.C. 409 (C.R.). 
67. Ibid., at pp. 415-416. The right referred to by his Lordship is that of the subscribers to 
ask for the nullity of their subscription and reimbursement of their advances: ibid., at 
p. 415. A reference is made toln re Scottish Petroleum Co.—Anderson's Case, (1881) 
17 Ch.D. 373. In the Duquenne case, the trustee had represented that he would be 
managing director of the future company but this proved to be false. This type of 
representation was held sufficient in the Anderson Case to nullify the contract. Renaud 
et Smith, op. cit., vol. II, at p. 667 n. 49; Gross, op. cit., at p. 194. 
68. R. Demers, "From the Bubble Act to the pre-incorporation trust: investor protection 
in Quebec law", (1977) 18 C. de D. 335, at pp. 366 and following. 
69. Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II, at p. 667 n. 49; Wegenast, op. cit. at p. 262. 
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Another exception to the rule stated above is that the company can 
be liable to a certain extent where it actually has knowledge that a 
fraudulent representation has been made by a third party: this is usually 
described as the rule in Karberg's Case10. It was held in that case that the 
misrepresentations of a promoter contained in a prospectus will allow the 
subscriber to ask for the nullity of his contract on the basis that the 
contract was concluded on the terms of the prospectus and that "the 
acceptance of the application by the allotment of the shares is the accep-
tance of the offer on those terms,. . ."7I . 
Whatever is the precise basis of the company's liability under com-
mon law, the Quebec Civil Code offers an original solution to this difficult 
question. Article 993 C.c. reads as follows: 
"Fraud is a cause of nullity when the artifices practised by one or with his 
knowledge are such that the other party would not have contracted without 
them. . ." 
In French law, the fraud of a third party is not a valid cause of 
nullity72: in the context of preincorporation contracts, French courts have 
even held that this was insufficient to justify the nullity of the contract73 
although recent views have criticised this approach74. In Quebec, the 
position is different: our Code clearly admits the possibility of a fraud 
committed by a third party as a nullifying cause75 and it is submitted that 
this should also apply to circumstances where a promoter has made a 
70. Metropolitan Coal Consumers' Association-Karberg's Case, [1892] 3 Ch. 1 (C.A.); 
" . . . by no means an easy case to understand. . .": Note, (1938) 82 Sol. J. 923-924, 
942-943 at p. 942; Gower, op. cit., at pp. 322-323. 
71. Karberg's Case, ibid., at p. 13 per Lindley, J. See also Gower, op. cit., at p. 323 n. 
59. 
72. R. Demogue, Traité des obligations en general, voll .I Rousseau, Pariss ,923, at pp. 577. 
578-79. For a criticism of this rule in French law, see: Encyclopédie Dalloz, Droit 
civil, vol. 2, p. 247 par. 34 (1952 and Suppl., 1973). 
73. Lyon, 6.3. 1912, Gaz. Trib. 1912 2esem., 2.225, S. 1913.2.129 with a note by M. Wahl. 
See also Demogue, op. cit., vol. I at p. 577. 
74. Escarra et Rault, op. cit., vol. II at p. 112 n. 601 and also at p. 110 n. 601. 
Hémard, Terré et al, op. cit., vol. I at pp. 601-602 n. 665. 
75. Article 993 C e ; Baudouin, Les Obligations at p. 82 n. 132. Trudel, op. cit., suggests 
an explanation for this rule: "il nous faut trouver le concept de faute dans le seul profit 
qu'une personne tire de la connaissance d'un acte dolosif commis par un 
étranger. . .": ibid., at p. 194. Would the rule of article 993 C.c. be a simple application 
of the principle that "nul ne doit s'enrichir aux dépens d'autrui"? See Rhodes v. 
Starnes, supra n. 15 at pp. 116 and 118 where Johnson, J., suggests this explanation. 
On unjust enrichment generally, vide: Baudouin, Les Obligations, at pp. 215-228, and 
more precisely at pp. 215-216, where the author points to the relationship between 
unjust enrichment and fraud: ibid., par. 411. 
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fraudulent statement to the knowledge of the company76. However, an 
important distinction must be made. Where in the case of a mandatary 
the company is liable for damages under the principle of article 1731 C.c, 
this would not apply to a case under article 993 C.c. In such a case, the 
only recourse against the company is an action in nullity of contract77: it 
cannot be liable for damages because in fact, it did not make the fraudu-
lent statement. Only the person who actually is responsible for the falsity 
of the prospectus will be liable in damages, whereas the company will be 
liable to an action in nullity of the subscription78. 
ii. Who can sue? 
The rule in English law is that a person is entitled to sue in an action 
for deceit if he can prove that the prospectus was intended to be distri-
buted to him or at least that he should see it in order to influence his 
decision to buy: thus, if he simply buys from an existing shareholder or on 
the open market, he cannot claim damages79 unless he proves that the 
prospectus "was intended to induce market dealings. . ."80. In Quebec, 
jurisprudence has followed closely the rulings of English courts on this 
76. Ibid. There is, however, no case on this point: perhaps the Duquenne case, supra n. 
66 at pp. 415-416 can be explained on the basis of article 993 C.c. 
77. Trudel, op. cit., at pp. 184-185. Baudouin, Les Obligations, at p. 81 note 132. The same 
rule is applicable in English law. Vide Karberg's Case, supra n. 70 per Lindley, L. 
J., at p. 13: "The company, not having made the representation by itself or by its 
agents, is not liable in damages; but as regards rescission of contract, the company is in 
the same position as if it had made the representation itself. . ." 
78. As a rule, an agreement between a promoter and a shareholder will not bind the 
company because the promoter has no power of representation: Connecticut and 
Passumpsic Rivers RR. Co. v. Comstock,, (1870) 20 R.J.R.Q. 392 (Q.B.) at p. 406 
where the Court distinguished between the fraudulent act of a promoter and of the 
company as a cause of nullity of a contract. See also: Leroy v. J. A. Davis Co. Ltd. 
(1919) 55 Que. S.C. 497 (C.R.) at pp. 499-500; National Insurance Co. v. Hatton, 
(1880) 24 L.C.J. 26 (Q.B.) at p. 26. Thus a fraud on the part of the promoter will not 
bind the company in principle. However, if the company profits thereby, it will be 
bound. On the application of unjust enrichment to the field of pre-incorporation con-
tracts in Quebec law, see J. Smith, "Duties and powers of promoters",(1973-74) 76 R. 
du N. 207 at pp. 232-235. It is the same principle that governs the case under examina-
tion; a fraud in a prospectus will not bind the company where it has been carried out 
by the promoters, unless the company profits thereby. The rule of article 993 C.c. is a 
statutory application of the principles of unjust enrichment in this field. See also supra 
n. 75. 
79. Gower, op. cit., at pp. 320-321 commenting with severity on Peek v. Gurney, (1873) 
L.R. 6 H.L. 377, the House of Lords decision that established the principle. See also 
Côté, loc. cit., n. (1), at p. 149. 
80. Gower, ibid., at p. 320; Andrews v. Mockford, [1896] 1 Q.B. 372 (C.A.). 
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matter and have refused to admit that a prospectus might create rights in 
the case of the unsolicited investor. Thus, in Rhodes v. Starnes81, which 
was not a case dealing with a prospectus but with annual statements82, 
Johnson, J., followed the authority of Peek v. GurneySi and thought that 
the liability of directors for fraudulent statements could not last ad in-
finitum44 and for that reason, preferred to adopt English authorities on 
this question85. 
The learned judge's view is open to serious criticism. At the time, it 
was probably difficult for a Quebec court to refuse to follow the ruling of 
the House of Lords in such "a case of recent date"86 and high authority: 
however, there are two reasons why Johnson, J.'s view should not pre-
vail. In civil law, it is well established that where one commits a delict, 
one is liable for the damages caused to any person adversely affected by 
one's fault: this is the rule in Quebec law87 and was stated as such by the 
Supreme Court of the country88. Thus as a matter of principle, where a 
81. Supra n. 15. 
82. Ibid., at p. 114. In a sense, this limits the impact of the case although as a rule a 
fraudulent misrepresentation, whether in a prospectus, in an annual statement or any 
other document should be governed by the same principles of law. 
83. Supra n. 79, Johnson J., referred to the case at pp. 120 and following of his judg-
ment. 
84. Ibid., at p. 123. ". . . Therefore as to the duration of existing responsibility, that case 
and this one are on the same footing; and it was as to the injustice of the duration of 
this responsibility, if it existed, at all, that Lord Cairns was speaking. . ." 
85. In the Rhodes case, Johnson, J., was well aware that the issue could have been 
discussed by following principles of civil law. Note at p. 114 his reference to article 
1053 C.c. as establishing " . . . a general principle of liability, of which I will not stop 
now to discuss the limitations. . ." See also at p. 119. 
It is of interest to note that the judge also made the distinction that where reports of the 
company are "industriously circulated" then the liability of the directors might extend 
to any member of the genera) public because it was meant to be an inducement to such 
persons: ibid., at pp. 117-118 where he refers to New Brunswick and Canada Railway 
and Land Co. v. Conybeare, (1862) 31 L.J. 297 (H.L.). In that case, Lord Westbury 
made the distinction that Andrews v. Mockford, supra n. 80 was to consecrate more 
than twenty years later. 
86. Ibid., at p. 120 of Johnson, J.'s opinion, "it is a leading case. . .": ibid. 
87. J. L. Baudouin, La responsabilité civile délictuelle, at pp. 80-85 where the author 
reviews the jurisprudence and doctrine of the Province on this issue. In civil law, the 
rule is clear that all persons who suffer a damage resulting from the commission of a 
delict are entitled to compensation. Thus, Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 82 n. 104 tells us: 
" . . . Du moment qu'un acte fautif lèse le droit d'autrui, il y a lieu en principe à 
compensation. Il apparaît à cet égard contraire à la logique même des principes 
généraux de la responsabilité civile de restreindre à la seule victime directe le droii à la 
compensation. . ." 
88. Congrégation des Petits Frères Maristes v. Regent Taxi, [1929] S.C.R. 650. For an 
analysis of this important case, vide Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 81 n. 102 and following. 
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fraudulent prospectus is issued, the person responsible for the fraud 
should be answerable to every subscriber and purchaser of shares, if they 
can establish an appreciable damage89. This is the rule of French law90 
and one finds it extremely difficult to see why a different principle should 
be applied in Quebec simply because the delict is committed in the con-
text of the Companies Act. The argument that the directors' liability 
cannot last ad infinitum9* is an interesting and somewhat valid point: 
however, one must stress the fact that it does not last perpetually, for 
liability arising out of delicts, in civil law, is extinguished after a period of 
two years92 and this rule is applicable to fraudulent statements of every 
kind93. It is true that prescription starts to run only when the damage 
actually occurs and not from the moment of the commission of the 
fraud94: this rule, however, dees not expose the directors to a permanent 
liability for the false prospectus. The true question, as pointed out by 
Baudouin95 always remains in such cases of establishing a direct link 
between the delict and the damages: a plaintiff who suffers a loss years 
after the office of the prospectus is over96 has the burden of establishing 
clearly that his damage is a direct consequence of the delict and simply 
not a remote one97 In the particular case of a prospectus this burden will 
of itself limit the number of actions that can be taken against directors 
without straining unduly the rules governing civil liability in order to 
adarjt them to such circumstances 
89. The test is in fact whether the plaintiff can establish a causal link between the delict 
and the damage. Thus, in the case of a prospectus, a purchaser on the open market 
must establish a clear connection between the false statements of the prospectus and 
the damages he suffered. On this point, vide Baudouin, op. cit., at pp. 82-83 n. 104 
90. R. R. Pennington, The investor and the law, MacGibbon & Kee, London, 1968, at p. 
196. For an analysis of English law, ibid., at pp. 194-195. 
91. Rhodes v. Starnes, supra n. 15 at p. 123, referring to Lord Cairns "admirable 
judgment" in Peek v. Gurney. 
92. Article 2261 (2) C e ; Baudouin, La responsabilité civile délictuelle, at p. 464, n. 722. 
93. A false statement on the part of a director gives rise to a liability that is extinguished 
after two years: Préfontaine v. Grenier, (1906) 27 Que. S.C. 307 (C.R.) at pp. 321-324 
per Robidoux, J., in the Superior Court; Lavergne, J., diss., at pp. 329-330 and Curran, 
J., at pp. 349-351; Loranger, J., at pp. 353-354, all three judges in the Court of Review 
agreeing on the matter of principle. Note that this issue was not discussed in the higher 
courts: (1906) 15 Que. K.B. 143; 15 Que. K.B. 563 (P.C.). 
94. Préfontaine v. Grenier, ibid.; Baudouin, op. cit., at pp. 468-469, pars. 731-732. 
95. Baudouin, op. cit., at pp. 82-83, par. 104. 
96. Rhodes v. Starnes, supra n. 15 at p. 123; Côté, loc. cit., n. (1), at p. 175. 
97. Baudouin, op. cit., at pp. 80 and following. For a similar view in English law: Gower, 
op. cit., at p. 320. 
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One last note on the Rhodes cases: when one examines the basis of 
the Court's reasoning in such cases as Peek v. Gurney98 and its Quebec 
counterpart, one actually finds that the judges of the period were usually 
biased in favour of the directorate and the interest of commerce often 
justified exemptions from the traditional rules applicable to the common 
mortal". This preferential treatment has of course subsided in recent 
years and directors and other company officials are now bound to act 
according to very high and strict standards: this change of attitude would 
undoubtedly alter the outcome of such cases if they were to be decided 
today by our provincial courts. 
In Quebec, the rule of civil law is that a person who suffers a damage 
from a fraudulent statement is entitled to relief: in the field of liability 
arising from a false prospectus, this would mean that every person incur-
ring a loss due to such a document would have a recourse against the 
person making the false statement, whether he be a subscriber or a pur-
chaser on the open market. 
b. The action in nullity 
The main consequence, as far as a contract to take up shares is 
concerned, is that the defrauded party can ask for the nullity of his sub-
scription. As pointed out by Beaudry, J., in The Glen Brick Co. v. Shack-
n inn 
well , 
" . . . des souscriptions à un fonds social ou stock, obtenues par surprise, fraude, 
et par de faux états des affaires de la compagnie faits par ses officiers et ses 
directeurs, sont nulles et ne produisent aucune obligation. Les actionnaires ainsi 
98. Supra n. 79. 
99. In Quebec, the tendency in the nineteenth century was to avoid imposing a liability on 
the directors unless they were guilty of gross negligence or fraud. See, e.g., Thérien v. 
Brodie, (1893) 4 Que. S.C. 23; Connolly v. The Montreal Park and Island RR. Co.. 
(1902) 22 Que. S.C. 322 (C.R.) at pp. 359-361 where Mathieu, J., suggested that where 
directors are in a position of conflict of interest they cannot be made accountable at 
law if they act bona fide. Other good examples of this judicial clemency towards the 
directorate: Rhodes v. Starnes, supra n. 15 at p. 122; Préfontaine v. Grenier, (1906) 
27 Que. S.C. 307 (C.R.); (1906) Que. K.B. 143, 563 (P.C.). This attitude has been 
severely criticized: J. Smith, "The duties of care and skill of corporate executives in 
the company law of the Province of Quebec", (1974) 34 R. du B. 464 where the author 
demonstrates how the Courts and the Legislature progressively adopted a more critical 
attitude towards those officers: directors came to be judged according to more univer-
sal standards and the interests of commerce were to give way to the protection of the 
investor. 
100. (1870) 2 R.L. 625 (S.C). 
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trompés peuvent même recouvrer ce qu'ils ont payé en acompte de leurs 
parts. . .""0I. 
Thus, the subscriber has a right of asking for the nullity of the sub-
scription if he can prove that the company has fraudulently represented a 
fact in the prospectus: this means that the representations must have been 
made by an authorised agent of the company102 or by the board of direc-
tors'03. Consequently, misrepresentations on the part of a promoter will 
give no right to the subscriber, unless of course the company has knowl-
edge of such illegality104. 
The nullity resulting from a fraud is a relative one'05. It is established 
in favour of the contracting party: he can renounce thereto by ratification 
of the fraudulent act or he can lose the right to rescind by prescription or by 
a supervening event like the winding-up of the company. 
i. Ratification 
In civil law, the nullity resulting from a fraudulent misrepresentation 
being a relative one is always open to ratification106 or confirmation107 
as opposed to absolute nullities that can never be covered108. In cases of 
contracts to take up shares, the subscriber can ratify the nullity either 
expressly or impliedly'09. In cases of express ratification, there is of 
101. Ibid.,at p. 625; Johnston v. The Ewart Co. Ltd., (1908) 14 R. de JJ .32(S.C.)atp. 335; 
Dorchester Electric Co. v. Thompson, (1915) 48 Que. S.C. 471; 48 R. de J. 27(S.C.)at 
pp. 29-31. Plaintiff is also entitled to be reimbursed the calls or monies he has ad-
vanced: Leroy v. J.A. Davis and Co. Ltd., (1919) 55 Que. S.C. 497 (C.R.) at p. 500. 
The general rule of contracts is of course the same one: Baudouin, Les Obligations at 
p. 82, par. 135. For a recent but unreported case on the matter: Commercial Trust 
Company Ltd. v. Littler, S.C.M., n. 757 251, 21 November 1974. 
An important distinction has to be made in such cases: if plaintiff is in fact one of the 
original petitioners for the company's charter, he is not entitled to ask for the nullity of 
his contract, even for reason of fraud: the only way he can be relieved of his duties is 
by asking for the nullity of the charter. Bergeron v. La Cie. de meubles de Jonquière, 
(1913) 22 Que. K.B. 341 at p. 346 and even that possibility seems to be restricted 
because of the fact that plaintiffs name in the letters-patent might have acted as an 
inducement to third parties who thereafter became members of the company: ibid., at 
p. 351. See also Giguere v. Colas, (1915) 48 Que. S.C. 198 at p. 203 for a similar 
reasoning in cases where there is absence of consideration. 
102. Vide, supra, n. 62. 
103. Ibid. See also Gower, op. cit., at pp. 322-323. 
104. Supra, n. 76. 
105. Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 82, n. 135. See also article 1000 C.c. 
106. Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 148, n. 260. 
107. Ibid., article 1214 C.c. 
108. Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 147, par. 259. 
109. Ibid., at p. 148, par. 260. 
R. DEMERS Prospectus Liability 765 
course no problem: the shareholder affirms the contract voluntarily, 
knowing that a fraud has been committed but to which he is ready to 
assent110. It is where the ratification is implied that problems arise in 
Quebec law. Most authorities agree on the proposition that a shareholder 
who has a right to repudiate his contract for any reason might be debarred 
from doing so if he has acted in such a way as is consistent only with his 
desire to affirm the contract: the authorities in this instance have gener-
ally followed English precedents to state the rule without making any 
allowances for civil law distinctions ' " . Active participation in the affairs 
of the company implies a willingness on the part of the shareholder to 
accept his quality of member of the corporation, notwithstanding the fact 
that he has a right to ask to be relieved of his obligations112. 
Ratification resulting from acts is thus one way of covering the nul-
lity: but what about the case where one does nothing at all, although one 
knows of a cause of nullity entitling one to the rescision of one's contract? 
The rule of the Civil Code governing the matter is expressed at article 
2258 C.c. 
"2258. The action[s]. . . in rescission of contracts for error, fraud, violence or 
fear, are prescribed by ten years. This time runs. . . in the case of error or fraud 
from the day it was discovered. . ." 
110. Note that if the express ratification is in writing, it has to respect the conditions of 
article 1214 C e ; Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 148 par. 260 allhough this is only necessary as 
an evidentiary requirement. The shareholder only validly ratifies an obligation when 
he has full knowledge of the facts that he is willing to confirm: Prévost v. Allaire, 
(1861) 11 L.C.R. 293 (Q.B.) at p. 320. 
111. Robert v. The Montreal Trust Co., ( 1917) 56 S.C.R. 342, at pp. 354-358, 361-364 for an 
extensive review of English authorities. Rhodes v. Starnes, supra n. 15 at p. 122. 
For other cases establishing the principle, vide: Pineau v. La Cie. Neigette, (1916) 22 
R.L. n.s. 154(K.B.)at pp. 156-157; Caverhill v.Burland,( 1888) 4M.L.R. 169(S.C.)at 
pp. 175-176; Stadacona Insurance Co. v. Côté, (1879) 5 Q.L.R. 133 (S.C.) at pp. 
136-137; (1880) 6 Q.L.R. 147 (Q.B.) at p. 155; The Windsor Hotel Co. v. Lewis, ,1881) 
26 L.C.J. 29 (Q.B.) at p. 34. Ratification by conduct is admitted by civil law: Baudouin, 
op. cit., at p. 148 par. 260. 
112. Acting as a shareholder when there is no valid contract or where such contract is open 
to an action in nullity will entitle the Court to presume that a valid contract is in 
existence: in In re Drummond Cotton and Bleaching Co. Ltd., (1906) 13 R. de J. 232 
(S.C.) at pp. 234-236, Lynch, J., made an extensive review of the Quebec jurispru-
dence on the question of the theory of the de facto shareholder. See also: Arless v. The 
Belmont Manufacturing Co., (1885) 1 M.L.R340(Q.B.)at pp. .45-346; MacDougall vv 
The Union Navigation Co., (1877) 21 L.C.J. 63 (Q.B.); Renaud et Smith, op. cit., 
vol. II at pp. 603-605. However, one can seriously question the application of such a 
doctrine to Quebec law. The doctrine is predicated on the principle of estoppel: Re-
naud et Smith, ibid., at p. 694 and estoppel is unknown to Quebec law: Mignault, J., in 
Grace and Co. v. Perras, (1921) 62 S.C.R. 166 at p. 172; J.-G. Castel, Le juge Mignault 
défenseur de l'intégrité du droit civil québécois, (1975) 53 C.B.R. 544 at p. 549. 
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What the article seems to suggest is that where one has a right to ask for 
the nullity of a contract on the ground of fraud, one can actually wait ten 
years before bringing the action. The Courts have examined the problem in 
the context of fraudulent representations to induce a party to take up 
shares but even today, as a matter of principle, the state of the jurispru-
dence on this point is generally confused113. 
In one interesting case, Robert v. The Montreal Trust Co.U,, the 
Supreme Court of Canada expressed the view that on this question 
Quebec law should follow common law authorities and apply the rule that 
a considerable delay in asking for a nullity should be tantamount to ac-
quiescence, notwithstanding the formulation of article 2258 C.c. Anglin, 
J., a judge of considerable note and common law training, rendered the 
following opinion in the course of his judgment: 
"It would, I think, be most unsatisfactory if the right of a subscriber in Quebec 
for shares in a Dominion company to disaffirm his obligation to take or pay for 
them should endure for ten years after he had fully learned the facts which render 
that obligation voidable, whereas the like right of a subscriber in British Colum-
bia or Ontario for shares in the same company would be unavailable to him 
should he fail to repudiate his obligation with the utmost promptitude reasonably 
possible after discovering its voidability. While I should deprecate any attempt to 
modify or affect any doctrine of the civil law of Quebec or an established con-
struction of any legislation of that province by an introduction of English law or 
by adopting English views or practice merely for the sake of securing confor-
mity, I incline to think that in regard to subscriptions for shares in companies, 'in 
the absence of any legislation in force in Quebec inconsistent with the law as 
acted upon in England' and other provinces of Canada, and in the absence of any 
jurisprudence or established practice to the contrary, the courts of Quebec might 
well accept and apply the English rule imposing prompt repudiation as a condi-
tion of maintaining a plea of misrepresentation or granting the relief of rescission 
on that ground. . . "" 5 . 
113. Even in the general law of contract, the rule is not clear: Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 148 
par. 260, n. 431. Baudouin discusses the view that suggests that delay in asking for 
the nullity of the contract is tantamount to acquiescence but as he points out: "Ceci a 
pour effet en pratique de réduire considérablement, sinon d'annihiler les effets de la 
prescription de 10 ans. . .": ibid. The problem is still not settled in civil law: see, e.g., 
Renzi v. Azeman, [1959] Que. S.C. 170 at p. 176 where Collins, J., remarked that a 
plaintiff in such cases has a ten-year delay to act and that". . . his failure to do so 
within such time would not constitute a ratification or confirmation by itself alone. . ." 
114. Supra n. 111. 
115. Ibid., at pp. 363-364, quoting from Préfontaine v. Grenier [1907] A.C. 101 (P.C.) at p. 
110. The rule is predicated on the basis that by remaining a shareholder, the member 
induces others to take up shares in a company: ibid., at p. 356. Also: National Insur-
ance Co. v. Hatton, (1879) 24 L.C.J. 26 (Q.B.) at p. 27; Johnston v. The Ewart Co., 
supra n. 101 at p. 336. Some cases have based the rule on the doctrine of estoppel: 
Montreal Trust Co. v. Robert, (1917) 52 Que. S.C. 73 (C.R.) at pp. 79-80; National 
Insurance Co. v. Hatton, ibid., at pp. 27-28. However, estoppel is unknown to civil 
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The view is an interesting one but is open to serious criticism. The 
learned judge suggests the adoption of English law on this issue, arguing 
that there is no law or authority in Quebec "inconsistent" with the En-
glish position. This is not true. As for the "inconsistent" law, article 2258 
C.c. clearly states a rule different from the one prevailing in England. As 
for authorities, the learned judge would have been surprised to learn that 
the Supreme Court had already given, more than thirty years before, a 
contrary ruling. In Côté v. Stadacona Insurance Co.116, Fournier, J., 
decided that where a party to a subscription contract had a right to ask for 
the nullity of the contract on the ground of error or fraud117, his right to do 
so lasted for ten years"8 and during that period, he was under no obliga-
tion to act. The learned judge said, inter alia, 
"Le deuxième motif du jugement attaqué, consistant à dire que l'appelant ne 
peut plus opposer les vices dont on admet que son contrat est entaché, parce 
qu'il a laissé un délai de près de deux ans, sans prendre aucune mesure judiciaire 
pour faire rescinder sa souscription, ne me paraît pas fondé en loi. Pour lui 
opposer ce moyen avec succès, il faudrait établir par quelque texte de droit qu'il 
était obligé d'agir dans le délai de deux ans. . . Il aurait pu,. . . prendre 
l'initiative, mais ce n'est qu'une faculté qu'il était libre d'exercer ou non, à son 
gré. . . Dans le cas où l'on considérerait qu'il y a eu contrat, mais que le con-
sentement à ce contrat a été vicié par le dol ou l'erreur, le contrat étant annulable 
law: supra n. 112 and consequently, the authority of such cases in greatly di-
minished. The Supreme Court of Canada's earlier tendency of sacrificing the rules of 
civil law to the more general rules of common law has often been decried: for a recent 
critical appraisal of this approach, see J. L. Baudouin, "L'interprétation du Code civil 
québécois par la Cour Suprême du Canada", (1975) 53 S.CR. 715. In the field of 
company law, it was not the first attempt to overthrow the application of civil law 
principles in favour of common law rules: vide the judgment of the same court in The 
Exchange Bank of Canada v. Fletcher, (1890) 19 S.C.R. 278 at pp. 288-289. Whether 
the main preoccupation of the tribunal in such cases was to ensure uniformity of 
commercial rules is not always apparent but this method of interpretation could not be 
a valid one: where the Civil Code in Quebec gives a clear rule to be applied, one finds it 
extremely difficult to understand the approach of those earlier cases suggesting that 
common law rules should prevail over the logic of civil law. The paramount duty of the 
courts is to apply the law as it is stated and not to create absurdities for the sake of 
convenience: on this point, Abbott v. Fraser, (1874) 20 L.C.J. 197 (Q.B.) at p. 201. 
Whether the rule of civil law is desirable or not should not be a factor influencing a 
court in deciding which law or rule to apply. 
116. (1881) 6 S.C.R. 193. For the lower courts: (1880) 6 Q.L.R. 147 (Q.B.);(1879) 5Q.L.R. 
133 (S.C.). 
117. The rule is the same for error and fraud under article 2258 C.c. Note that the case also 
discussed the nullity resulting from absence of consent. In such a case, it is an absolute 
nullity and the Court was of opinion that a thirty-year delay would be allowed to 
plaintiff. Vide, ibid., at pp. 215-217. Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II, at pp. 690-691. 
118. Article 2258 C.c. 
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seulement, l'appelant avait encore en vertu de l'article 2258 Ce. de Québec, dix 
ans pour prendre son action en nullité. . . " " ' . 
Thus, the learned judge was of the opinion that there was no positive 
duty incumbent at law upon plaintiff to act before the ten-year delay was 
over and that he was entitled to wait that period before asking for the 
nullity of his contract. Anglin, J.'s views in the Robert case120 seem 
doubtful in light of the previous Supreme Court of Canada decision: it is 
of interest to note that whereas the Robert case was decided by a judge of 
common law training, the Côté case was settled by a civil law jurist. 
In Quebec, the rule should be as expressed by Fournier, J.: a plain-
tiff, in an action in nullity, should be entitled to the ten-year delay specifi-
cally given by the Code, unless proof that he has ratified the contract can 
be adduced. Mere omission to act should not constitute a cause for imply-
ing on plaintiffs part an intention to ratify the contract. The rule of 
English law is predicated on the desire of protecting innocent third par-
ties: if a subscriber remains a shareholder for a number of years without 
prompt repudiation, this acts as an inducement to third parties to join the 
company. Consequently, he is estopped from asking for the nullity of his 
contract on this ground121. In civil law, the same problem can be settled 
differently: if one respects the delays of article 2258 C.c, one should be 
entitled to rescission if nothing has been done to imply a ratification. 
However, third parties who have joined the company might have a re-
course against the plaintiff under the general rule of article 1053 C.c: he 
might be answerable in damages for his omission to act, knowing very 
well that creditors and new members rely to a certain extent on his 
participation to the capital of the company. 
This particular aspect of the law of misrepresentation in Quebec 
presents considerable difficulties that have yet to be settled by the au-
thorities: it also highlights the conflict between civil and common law in 
Canadian company law, where courts are torn between a justifiable desire 
119. Supra n. 116 at pp. 215-216 where the learned judge referred to: F. Laurent, Prin-
cipes de droit civil français, vol. 15, A. Durand, Paris, 1869-78, at p. 536 n. 465. 
Vide also in the same case, Henry, J., at p. 223; Brownlee v. Hyde, (1906) 15 Que. 
K.B. 221 at p. 229; Côté, loc. cit., n. (1), at pp. 171 and following for possible 
legislative amendments to such a rule. 
120. Supra n. 111. 
121. Gower, op. cit., at p. 337 n. 34, where the author suggests that the rule is based on 
estoppel. Even in the common law provinces of Canada, there is some uncertainty as 
to whether the English rule should prevail: Wegenast makes an extensive review of all 
the authorities and concludes that English rulings on this point should be received with 
caution in Canada: op. cit., at pp. 305-307, 734 and 737-738. In Quebec, the rule cannot 
be applicable for estoppel is unknown to civil law. Supra n. 112. 
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to harmonise the rules concerning share capital throughout the country 
and an invincible will on the part of Quebec judges to preserve at all costs 
the purity of their civil law heritage. 
ii. Loss of the right to rescind: the winding-up of the company. 
In English law, it is generally accepted that the right to rescind a 
contract for fraud will not be exercisable once the winding-up of the 
company has started122: if the plaintiff has commenced his action before 
the winding-up proceedings, his right will be preserved123 but lost if he 
should try to exercise it after that moment. 
It is not easy to determine the exact rationale of this rule and au-
thorities differ on the basis of the principle. One view124 argues that " . . . 
the member having subscribed to the share capital has allowed the com-
pany to obtain credit on the strength of it. . ."12S: forthat reason, once the 
creditors' rights become involved in the winding-up of the company, they 
are entitled to look to this "guarantee fund"126 for the satisfaction of their 
rights and the shareholder cannot at that moment repudiate his obliga-
tions. 
This explanation has been criticised, however, and an alternative has 
been suggested to this approach. Professor Hornby concludes, after an 
examination of various sections of the Companies Act, 1948127: 
"The true basis of the rule would appear to be that by these provisions, on the 
commencement of winding up the company's assets become subject to the rights 
122. Gower, op. cit., at p. 327. This is the rule established by Oakes v. Turquand, (1867) 
L.R. 2 H.L. 325. 
123. Ibid. 
124. Gower, op. cit., at pp. 326-327. Also at pp. 104-105. 
125. Ibid., at p. 327. 
126. Homby, in (1955) 71 L.Q.R. 415 at p. 416. Professor Homby was then reviewing the 
first edition of Gower's Principles of modern company law (1954). 
In America, jurisprudence on this question is in a state of complete confusion: 18 
C.J.S. 842 n. 326 (Suppl. 1975). However, one line of cases adopts this "guarantee 
fund" approach: ibid., at pp. 842-843. In the American jurisdictions, this has given rise 
to the peculiar "trust fund" doctrine: J. J. Norton, "Relationship of shareholders to 
corporate creditors upon dissolution: nature and implications of the "trust fund" 
doctrine of corporate assets", (1974-75) 30 Bus. L. 1061, [note at pp. 1077-1078 the 
discussion of such a doctrine in a civil law context (Louisiana)]; E. S. Hunt, "The trust 
fund theory and some substitutes for it", (1902-1903) 12 Yale L.J. 63. 
In Canada, the "trust fund" doctrine is generally considered inapplicable: Wegenast, 
op. cit., at pp. 338, 517; Martel, op. cit., vol. I at pp. 141, 148-151 and 307 n. 1. 
127. Ibid., at p. 417 where the author refers to ss. 13, 26, 212 and 213 of the Act. 
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of the creditors and contributories in liquidation, so that restitutio in integrum, 
and therefore rescission, are impossible. . ."I2S. 
It is because the rights of the creditors attach to the property of the 
company that the latter is incapable of giving back to the subscriber the 
monies paid in and consequently, the parties to the contract cannot be 
reinstated to their original positions: this explains the rule and as Hornby 
suggests, is one of general application in the field of winding-up as far as 
contracts involving the company are concerned129. 
The cases in Quebec on this point present a rather conflicting aspect. 
Most courts tend to apply the rule of English law without attempting to 
understand or explain it130. There is, however, one case of distinction 
where the learned judge tried to elucidate the reason of the ruling and 
applied in doing so English authorities, and surprisingly enough, French 
case law: that case was the Court of Appeal decision in Brownlee v. 
Hyden.. Champagne, J., speaking for the Court, adopted a position simi-
lar to the guarantee fund theory132 as a basis for refusing to allow an 
action in nullity of the contract, once the winding-up has begun. The 
learned judge said: 
". . . C'est sur la foi de sa signature. . . que les tiers ont contracté avec la 
compagnie, et ils ne sauraient être privés du recours qu'ils étaient en droit 
d'espérer contre lui. . . " ' " . 
128. Ibid., at p. 417. For a similar but earlier view, see A. Stiebe), op. cit., vol. I at p. 175. 
For an interesting criticism of this approach: Wegenast, op. cit., at pp. 731-735 where 
the author comes to the conclusion that this approach, in Canada at least, cannot be 
accepted: " . . . any argument as to the necessity of restitutio in integrum must be 
abandoned. . ." Ibid., at p. 735. 
129. Supra n. 126 at p. 417 where the author extends the application of the rule to the 
whole field of contracts involving the company, illustrating his point with special 
reference to promoters' contracts in cases of secret profit. 
130. Most cases have followed the Turquand rule, supra n. 122, without making any 
distinctions: the locus classicus in this respect is the decision of Archibald, J., in the 
two judgments rendered in Johnston v. The Ewart Co., (1907) 31 Que. S.C. 336 at 
pp. 337-338; (1908) 14 R. de J. 332 (S.C.) at p. 335. See also: Compagnie d'Hôtel 
St-Roch v. Barbeau, (1915) 48 Que. S.C. 94 at p. 96; Boulet v. Hudon, (1917) 51 Que. 
S.C. 29(C.R.)at p. 31; Note, in 10R.L. at pp. 65-66; Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II 
at pp. 676-678. 
131. (1906) 15 Que. K.B. 221. 
132. See the discussion, supra n. 126. 
133. Supra n. 131 at p. 227, quoting from Sir A. Lacoste's decision in McArthur v. 
Common, (1899) 8 Que. Q.B. 128 at p. 133. This last case was affirmed by the Supreme 
Court of Canada in (1898-99) 29 S.C.R. 239. 
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As authorities for this proposition, the learned judge referred to the 
standard English cases134 but he also adopted the reasoning of the French 
courts in this instance13S. It is interesting to note that the same rule 
applies in French law as in English law and that the nullity of the subscrip-
tion contract cannot be opposed to the company in liquidation or bank-
rupcy136. In French law also, commentators are not unanimous in estab-
lishing the motif of such a principle. One school adopts a "guarantee fund" 
approach as a justification. Lescot, for example, remarks137: 
" . . . Le motif, communément donné à l'appui de cette solution, est tiré du fait 
que, le capital social, tel qu'il a été fixé dans les statuts, étant porté à la connais-
sance des tiers par les moyens légaux de publicité, ceux-ci doivent pouvoir, en 
tout état de cause, compter sur lui pour être désintéressés, alors surtout que, 
dans les sociétés anonymes du moins, il constitue l'unique gage qui leur soit 
offert et que le plus souvent ils n'auront traité avec la société qu'en considération 
de son montant. . ."I38. 
Another explanation suggested by the commentators of French law is 
that the fraud of the company cannot be opposed to an innocent third 
party and the creditors in the winding-up fall in that category139. 
134. Ibid., at p. 228 of the same judgment, the learned judge referred to Oakes v. Turquand. 
supra n. 122; Tennenl v. The City of Glasgow Bank, (1879) 4 A.C. 615; Thompson on 
Corporations, vol. II, art. 1438 and note also at p. 227 of the case report, the re-
ference to W. J. White, A treatise on Canadian company law, C. Théoret éd., Mont-
réal, 1901, at p. 146. 
135. Champagne, J., referred to the classic French case on this point: the decision of the 
Court de Cassation in 10.2. 1868. Sirey 1868.1.149. This case remains to this day the 
most important one in French law on the issue: see Hémard, Terré et al., op. cit., 
vol. I at p. 602 n. 4. The Cour de Cassation held in that particular instance that the 
fraud of the company could not be opposed to the creditors under the general rule of 
civil law that the fraud of a third party will not affect an innocent person. Thus, in fact, 
the Brownlee case can be described as adopting a double position to explain the rule: 
the traditional guarantee fund doctrine and the rule of civil law concerning the effect of 
the fraud of a third party. 
136. Hémard, Terré et al., op. cit., vol. I at p. 602 par. 666. Escarra et Rault, op. cit., 
vol. II at pp. 248-249 par. 757. See also the following cases: 25 mai 1886, D.P., 
1887.1.379; Paris, 19 juin 1934, S., 1935.2.25 and the note on this case by Lescot. 
137. Paris, 19 juin 1934, S., 1935.2.25. 
138. Ibid., at p. 25. Lescot elaborates on the guarantee fund theory and suggests that the 
basis of the theory is a unilaterel obligation on the shareholder's part whereby he 
undertakes to be liable towards the future creditors of the company for the amount of 
his share. Ibid., at p. 25 ". . .la solution de la loi française qui, soucieuse de procurer 
aux tiers une garantie efficace, encore que limitée à un capital déterminé. . ." ibid. 
The author also argues that such an obligation is implicit in the contract of the 
shareholder: ibid., at pp. 25-26. Professor Gower's views on the subject, supra, n. 
125, thus have a striking counterpart in French company law. 
139. Supra, n. 135. Escarra et Rault, op. cit., vol. II at pp. 248-249 par. 757: " . . .La raison 
en est que la loi ne prend en considération que le dol émanant du cocontractant ou de 
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In Quebec, the rule that thus seems to prevail is that there is no right 
to ask for the nullity of a subscription contract for fraudulent misrepre-
sentation, where this right is invoked after the winding-up of the company 
has commenced, the rule being predicated in some instances on a theory 
familiar to English and French law and known as the "guarantee fund" 
doctrine. 
This would be all rather clear if it were not for the decision of the 
Quebec Superior Court in In re McDonald Lumber Co. et al.140 where 
Panneton, J., held that the bankruptcy of a company had no effect 
whatsoever on a subscriber's right to obtain the nullity of his contract for 
fraud and that such a defence was valid, even as against the trustee in 
bankruptcy141. The learned judge did not really discuss the issue and one 
would be tempted to dismiss his opinion as erroneous and expressing a 
minority view as far as Quebec law is concerned. However, this is not the 
case and surprisingly enough it is possible that Panneton, J.'s approach is 
the better one. There is no distinction to be drawn in this respect between 
winding-up and bankruptcy: the same rule should prevail in both cases142. 
How then, does one reconcile the authorities? 
Wegenast, in his admirable treatise on Canadian Companies*43, ex-
amined the problem in some detail and found, as a conclusion, that to 
assume generally that winding-up precludes rescission is erroneous, for 
many cases have settled the contrary point144. The question, according to 
the author, is one of knowing in each case whether the plaintiff has not in 
fact acquiesced to the nullifying cause: if one waits until the winding-up of 
a company to ask for the rescission of one's contract, this might be—but 
is not necessarily—an indication that the contract was indeed affirmed by 
plaintiff. 
ses complices. Or, le syndic représente non seulement la société mais la masse des 
créanciers. Il ne peut donc se voir opposer les manœuvres dolosives commises soit par 
les fondateurs, soit. . . par la société elle-même. . ." See however, Hémard, Terré et 
al., op. cit., vol. I at p. 602 par. 666 for a serious criticism of this approach and a 
suggestion that it should be abandoned. 
140. (1923) 3 C.B.R. 765 (S.C.); [1923] 4 D.L.R. 44 (S.C.). 
141. Ibid., at pp. 765-766 and see at p. 766 n. a the authorities cited by the Court. 
142. Wegenast, op. cit., at p. 736 and more particularly at n. 5. There is also no differ-
ence in this respect in French law: see Hémard, Terré et al., op. cit., vol. I at p. 602 
par. 666. 
143. "Canada's most valued commentator on the law of Canadian Companies. . ." per 
O'Connor, J., in Gattuso Investments Corporation v. Gattuso Corporation Ltd, (1971) 
14 C.B.R. (n.s.) 161 (S.C.) at p. 164. 
144. Ibid., at p. 735: " . . . the cases in which relief has been granted notwithstanding the 
commencement of winding-up are so numerous as to preclude any doubt. . ." and see 
the cases at n. 16 of p. 757, the last one mentioned being the Quebec case under 
examination. 
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"Nor can reliance be placed on the theory that any action for relief from a 
contract to take shares must be taken before a winding-up or bankruptcy has 
intervened. . . the authority of the cases on this point has been challenged. The 
view to the contrary was expressed by Mr. Holmested, Registrar in Bankruptcy 
for Ontario, as follows: " . . . In all such cases the question really turns on 
whether or not in the circumstances of each case the shareholder has by delay or 
otherwise debarred himself from getting the equitable relief he claims. The fact 
that the company has ceased to be a going concern before he takes effective steps 
to have his name removed from the register or list of shareholders is a most 
important fact. . . and it is this question of the state of the company at the time 
the relief is sought which may or may not, according to circumstances, preclude 
the shareholder from getting relief. . .' " I 4 5 . 
The test suggested by Wegenast is an ad hoc one: the circumstances of 
each case will indicate whether or not plaintiff has waited too long to ask 
for rescission and the fact that the company is now being wound-up will 
undoubtedly create a strong presumption that he has, although one can 
imagine situations where in fact the fraud and the winding-up are so 
closely linked together in time that plaintiff could not have asked for relief 
any sooner146. 
The rule in Quebec, it is submitted, should be modelled on 
Wegenast's views: although the majority of our cases do not seem to 
make finer distinctions on this complicated issue, it appears logical to 
explain all the cases by the acquiescence principle and to admit of rescis-
sion, even after winding-up has commenced, where there is a clear indica-
tion that plaintiff could not have acted in any other manner. Panneton, 
J.'s views in the McDonald Lumber Co. case147 follow the authorities 
referred to by Wegenast and should be the prevailing rule in Quebec148. 
Thus, the position in Quebec is ambivalent. There is some authority 
that admits as a basis for the rule the "guarantee fund" approach while 
145. Wegenast, ibid., at pp. 734-735, quoting extensively from: In re National Stadium Ltd. 
exporte Williams andPoyntz, (1922) 2 C.B.R. 195; 21 O.W.N. 346. 
146. "It is possible to conceive that the fraud and the winding-up order may be so closely 
connected in point of time, that the defrauded person has had no opportunity before 
the making of the winding-up order of prosecuting his claim to be relieved. In such a 
case, I do not think any case has been referred to which would preclude the defrauded 
person from relief. . .": Wegenast, ibid., at p. 735, still quoting from the same case. 
147. Supra n. 140. 
148. Panneton, i., ibid., at p. 766 n. a of his judgment refers to the In re National Stadium 
case, supra n. 146 that forms the basis of Wegenast's argumentation and also to In re 
Western Canada Fire Ins. Co.: Cowper's Case, (1915) 8 Alta. L.R. 348. See for 
another example of what seems to have been a case decided on the same principle: 
Boulet v. Hudon, (1917) 51 Que. S.C. 29 (C.R.) at p. 31. This approach would also 
explain the uneasiness of French law where the commentators of late have started to 
doubt of the traditional rule: Hémard, Terré et al., op. cit., vol. I at p. 602 par. 666. 
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others suggest that a shareholder could have the right to rescind his con-
tract at all times. This basic conflict of views will only be solved by future 
jurisprudence taking into account all the ramifications of this complex 
question. 
iii. The rescission of the contract: a requirement indispensable before 
an action in damages against the company? 
In English law, the right to sue the company for damages cannot be 
exercised if the subscriber elects to remain a member of the company and 
keeps his shares: this rule was stated by the House of Lords in 
Houldsworth v. The City of Glasgow Bank1*9. The basis of the rule has 
given rise to some conflict in the authorities150, one school suggesting that 
this rule is also predicated on the guarantee fund theory151 where another 
adopts a more literal interpretation of the case and suggests that an im-
plied term of a shareholder's contract with his fellow members is that his 
funds will be used to meet the liabilities of the company, amongst which 
are not to be included damages resulting from an action for fraud on the 
shareholder's part152. 
In Canada, the rule and its applications have been severely criticised. 
Wegenast has argued that basic differences between our Companies Acts 
and the English statute should preclude the application of the rule to our 
jurisdictions153. The author also indicated that the ordinary rules of con-
149. (1880) 5 A.C. 317 (H.L.); Pennington, op. cit., at p. 242; Gower, op. cit., at p. 319. In 
American jurisdictions, one can find a similar approach but the majority view now is 
that one can retain one's contract and also sue for damages: 28 C.J.S. 832-833 n. 
326. 
150. See the interesting debate between Professors Gower and Hornby in: (1956) 19 M.L.R. 
54, 61 and 185. 
151. Gower, ibid., at p. 62. See also, in his third edition of The principles of modern 
company law, where the author at p. 319 comments that "the reasons for this anoma-
lous rule are not altogether clear. . ." Also, at pp. 262, 276, 324, 329 and 330. 
152. Hornby, supra n. 150 at p. 57 and following. See also Lord Cairns' judgment at 
pp. 324-325, supra n. 149; Lord Selborne, at p. 329. For another discussion of the 
case: P. F.P. Higgins, "Rescission of contracts to take company shares", (1963) i. 
Tasmania U.L.R. 826 at pp. 838-841; J. Gross, "Civil liability for the contents of the 
prospectus in the light of the new Israeli Securities Law", (1973) 36 M.L.R. 600 at 
p. 605, for a statutory exception to the traditional rule. 
The minority view in American law has taken a similar approach to that of Professor 
Hornby. See: Virginia-Carolina Rubber Co. Inc. v. Flanagan, 142 S.E. 376,. 150 Vaa 
276 (1928), referring at p. 377 to the Houldsworth case, supra n. 149. 
153. Wegenast, op. cit., at pp. 733-734, where the learned author comments: "It is to be 
observed that the judgments in Houldsworth v. City of Glasgow Bank and its as-
sociated cases are all based on the analogy between a company and a partnership. . . 
The analogy of a partnership fails when applied to our letters patent companies, 
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tract allow the possibility of retaining the contract and suing for damages 
and that it was difficult to justify the exclusion of this rule in contracts to 
take up shares154. Finally, the author argues that the facts of the case do 
not really justify the wide formulation of the rule and that the House of 
Lords itself tried to avoid stating a general principlelss. 
In Quebec, cases have not followed nor criticised the Houldsworth 
rule and the authorities do not discuss the point at all156. However, if the 
courts were to be called upon to decide the issue, they should refuse to 
follow the ruling. In English law, the justification of the decision is still 
controverted and in common law provinces, as seen above, its application 
is seriously doubted157. In Quebec, the civil law allows a person the right 
to retain his contract and simply sue for damages in cases of fraud158. 
Consequently, it is submitted that the Houldsworth case should not 
be accepted in Quebec as an authoritative judgment: provincial courts 
have no real justification today for imposing a special regimen to the 
relationship of a shareholder to his company and for this reason, an action 
in damages should be possible even if the member wishes to retain his 
contract. 
B. NEGLIGENT STATEMENTS IN A PROSPECTUS: REMEDIES AT CIVIL LAW 
AND STATUTORY RELIEF. 
In English law, the traditional view was that a negligent statement on 
the part of a director, whether made generally or in a prospectus, did not 
impose on the person making it any liability at common law: it is only 
where plaintiff could establish that the statement was made fraudulently 
that the directors incurred liability in damages. This was the rule estab-
lished by the classic case of Derry v. Peek159 where Lord Herschell said: 
founded, as they are, on executive decree rather than partnership contract. And it 
would seem that whatever disability a shareholder of a chartered company may be 
under in claiming damages against the company would have to depend on the 
statute. . ." 
154. Ibid., at p. 733: " . . . to approbate and at the same time reprobate is precisely what he 
is entitled to do. . ." 
155. Ibid.,atpp. 735-736. 
156. Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II at p. 679 where the authors do not discuss the 
question when dealing with the recourses of a subscriber in damages for false represen-
tations. 
157. Wegenast, op. cit., at pp. 733-734. 
158. Baudouin, Les Obligations, p. 83 par. 136. 
159. (1889) 14 A.C. 337(H.L.). 
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" . . . I think those who put before the public a prospectus to induce them to 
embark their money in a commercial enterprise ought to be vigilant to see that it 
contains such representations only as are in strict accordance with fact, and I 
should be very unwilling to give any countenance to the contrary idea. I think 
there is much to be said for the view that this moral duty ought to some extent to 
be converted into a legal obligation, and that the want of reasonable care to see 
that statements, made under such circumstances, are true, should be made an 
actionable wrong. If it is to be done the legislature must intervene and ex-
pressly give the right of action in respect of such a departure from duty. . ."'60. 
The judicial suggestion was followed up and the next year, the Direc-
tors Liability Actl6i was enacted in order to cover cases of negligent 
misrepresentations in a prospectus. The statute was merged into the 
Companies Act162 and to this day, the Act makes it an actionable wrong to 
negligently state something in a prospectus which is not true163. Negligent 
statements thus became a statutory tort164 where the common law had 
refused to admit them under general principles of tort liability. 
However, the position in England is not so clear now since the House 
of Lords decision in Hediey Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. Heller & Partners 
Ltd.165 where the Law Lords held that in certain circumstances there might 
be a duty imposed upon one making a statement to see that a certain 
amount of care is taken to ensure that the statement is true166. Most 
authors agree that the decision would most probably apply in the context 
of mis-statements in a prospectus167 although there is some dispute as to 
160. Ibid., at p. 376; Gower, op. cit., at pp. 315-316; Pennington, op. cit., at p. 240. 
161. (1900) 53-54 Vict. c. 64 (U.K.). 
162. Wegenast, op. cit., at p. 691. 
163. For a discussion of what eventually became s. 43 of the Companies Act, 1948, see 
Gower, op. cit., at pp. 331-333. 
164. Pennington, op. cit., at p. 245: "The Companies Act, 1948, by sanctioning the statu-
tory claim, no doubt creates a statutory tort. . ." 
165. [1964] A.C. 465 (H.L.). 
166. To impose the duty, there must be a special relationship between the parties and the 
person giving advice must know that it will be relied upon: Pennington, ibid., at p. 243. 
167. Gower, op. cit., at pp. 316-317; R. C. A. White, "Towards a policy basis for the 
regulation of insider dealing", (1974) 90 L.Q.R. 494 at pp. 498-499; Pennington, The 
investor and the law, at p. 120-121 and note also at p. 185 where the author suggests 
that the only difference between the statutory tort of s. 43 and the Hediey Byrne 
principle would be one of evidence; also the same author, Company Law, at 
pp. 243-244. A recent Canadian case dealing with the question of negligent statements 
in the purchase of shares is Culling v. Sansai Securities Ltd, ( 1974) 45 D.L.R. .( r i) 456, 
at p. 462 where Anderson, J., followed the House of Lords' decision. This was a case 
of special relationship: it involved a broker-customer transaction. In civil law, there is 
no room for such an approach. For example, the relationship between a broker and a 
customer is one of mandate: article 1735 C.c. expressly admits this and see the dis-
cussion of this principle in Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II at pp. 555-556. If the 
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the persons who can actually claim damages under such a duty168. If the 
Hedley Byrne principle is applicable to company prospectuses, this would 
result in a very peculiar situation: the statutory relief now afforded by 
section 43 of the Companies Act would in a sense become useless because 
it would cover by statute a tort recognized by common law and apart from 
the evidentiary advantage169, the legislation would be merely duplicative 
of the common law on this point. 
This brings us to a discussion of the problem in Quebec law. A 
striking feature of the provincial Companies Act is that it contains no 
reference to prospectus liability. Quebec, unlike most provinces at the 
beginning of the century170 did not follow suit and copy the Directors 
Liability Act7'' which was to become a model for many Companies Acts 
in the common law provinces. As a matter of fact, there is no equivalent 
in our array of corporate legislations to a s. 43 of the Companies Act, 
broker is a mandatary, he is then bound to take all reasonable care in whatever he does 
for his client. This obligation is imposed by article 1710 C.c: 
"The mandatary is bound to exercise, in the execution of the mandate, reasonable 
skill and all the care of a prudent administrator. Nevertheless, if the mandate be 
gratuitous, the court may moderate the rigor of the liability arising from his negli-
gence or fault, according to the circumstances." 
This is applicable to brokers: Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II at pp. 560-561. See: 
Mount v. Regem, (1931) 51 Que. K.B. 482, at p. 485 where Bernier, J., remarked: 
". . . dans l'exécution de ses engagements, il doit apporter la plus stricte rigueur. . ." 
Thus, a broker in Quebec making a negligent statement will be liable in damages under 
article 1710 C.c. whereas in the common law provinces he will be liable under the 
principle of the Hedley Byrne case, as applied by the Culling case. 
168. Gower, op. cit., at p. 317 expressed the view that subscribers and purchasers on the 
market could sue under the principle where Pennington would restrict this right to 
existing shareholders: Company Law, at p. 243 and wonders whether the rule has not 
been restricted even further by the recent decision in Mutual Life and Citizens' Assur-
ance Co. Ltd v. Evatt, [1971] 1 All E.R. 150; ;1971] A.C. 793: :bid., at pp. 243-244. 
169. Pennington, The investor and the law, at p. 185. 
170. Wegenast, op. cit., at pp. 691-692, 700 and 711 for an interesting historical review of 
this question. The Federal Companies Act only adopted a similar section in 1917: ibid., 
at p. 700. It was to remain on the statute books until the new Act, passed in 1975: The 
Canada business corporations Act S.C. 1974-75-76, c. 33, assented to on the 
15 December 1975. This Act does not contain a prospectus liability section: the reason 
for this important change is that the provincial Securities Acts deal extensively with 
this question now and it was thought unecessary to duplicate the legislation. See the 
Commentary following the 1975 edition of the statute edited by CCH Canadian Ltd, at 
p. 111. This also sets to rest the difficult question of knowing whether the federal 
legislature could regulate fraud, this being normally within the jurisdiction of the 
provinces. See Wegenast, op. cit., at pp. 699-700; Côté, loc. cit., n. (1) at p. 139 
n. 11. 
171. Supra n. 161. 
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1948. What is the reason for this important omission? Is it explained by 
the fact that our legislation in this field has always been rather slow to 
adapt to newer ideas172 or is there a more fundamental explanation for the 
refusal of the provincial Legislature to copy the English model? 
The answer to this question lies in the peculiar nature of civil law 
responsibility. In Quebec law, a person who is negligent in any manner is 
liable in damages to the person who suffers from his act: this rule is of 
general application173, and consequently, a director who makes a negli-
gent declaration in a prospectus will be liable under the general principle 
of article 1053 C.c. 
The Directors Liability Act114 was enacted because a negligent 
statement was not an actionable tort at common law whereas, if the same 
case had arisen in Quebec, it would have been dealt with under the ge-
neral principle of liability set out in article 1053 C.c. This is the reason 
why there is no similar legislation in the Companies Act: what the civil 
law could deal with adequately was not to be regulated by the importation 
of unnecessary legislation. 
Before examining the provincial case law on this point, a comparison 
with French law, where the same problems are settled under the general 
liability section of the French Civil Code17S, will help to stress the original 
position of Quebec law. In French law, the making of a negligent state-
ment will give rise to civil liability176 and the rule is applicable in the 
context of contracts to take up shares. As Professor Pennington points 
out: 
". . . under the general provisions of the Civil Code, subscribers or purchasers 
of securities may recover damages from persons responsible for issuing an invita-
ion o invest u it contained false or misleading statements of fact made fraudu-
172. Professor Caron, in his preface to the second volume of M. & P. Martel's Aspects 
juridiques de la compagnie au Québec, 2"d ed., Publications Les Affaires, Montréal, 
1972, describes the provincial law as "victorienne": p. xix. 
173. Baudouin, La responsabilité civile délictuelle, at p. 70 par. 89. 
174. Supra n. 161. 
175. The French equivalent to article 1053 C.c. is to be found in articles 1382-1383 C.N. 
176. H. et L. Mazeaud et A. Tunc, Traité théorique et pratique de la responsabilité civile, 
vol. I, 5th ed., Ed. Montchréstien, Paris, 1957, at p. 555, par. 501, where the authors 
remark: " . . . celui qui donne des renseignements inexacts ou incomplets engage sa 
responsabilité quasi-délictuelle envers la personne visée par ces renseignements, 
lorsqu'il s'est informé à la légère, sans effectuer les vérifications désirables. .•." The 
authors also make an extensive review of the jurisprudence in French law on the 
question: ibid., at pp. 555-556 n. 2 and 3. 
In civil law, the distinction between delict and quasi-delict is mostly historical: 
Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 3 n. 2, although it has some significance from the point of 
view of the consequences of an act: ibid., at p. 4-5. 
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lently or negligently, and in the case of bankers and stockbrokers soliciting sub-
scriptions from their customers or clients, liability is imposed if they are guilty of 
imprudence or slight negligence in not ensuring that the invitation is 
accurate. . ."177. 
In this context, there are no restrictions similar to the ones set out by 
the House of Lords in the Hedley Byrne case178: in French law, the duty 
to exercise due care before giving information is a general one179 and it is 
not surprising to find that the French courts, when faced with a situation 
identical to that of the Hedley Byrne case, decided the issue according to 
the general civil liability section of the Civil Code180. 
The position in Quebec is similar to that of French law. Where a 
person purports to inform a third party and in doing so is negligent, he is 
liable under the general principle of article 1053 C.c..81. Thus, in Cossette 
v. Dun1*2, a credit information agency was held liable in damages for 
negligent statements made concerning a third party: this case was decided 
according to article 1053 C.c.183 and after indicating that French law 
should prevail on such question'84, Fournier, J., in the Supreme Court of 
Canada, went on to differentiate between civil and common law and 
stressed that on the issue involved, civil law offered wider relief: 
". . . II est inutile d'aller chercher soit dans le droit anglais soit dans le droit 
américain la solution de cette question. Les principes de ces législations 
n'étendent pas la responsabilité aussi loin que les art. 1053, 1054 du Code civil de 
la province de Québec. Ces articles ne font pas de la malice un des éléments de la 
responsabilité, ni de la bonne foi une exemption de cette responsabilité. Pour 
qu'il y ait responsabilité, il suffit qu'il y ait faute, imprudence, négligence ou 
inhabilité (sic)."185 
177. The investor and the law, at p. 192 referring to the decision of the Court of Appeal of 
Paris: Escale v. Banque de Paris et des Pays-Bas, reported at D.P., 1896.2.481. The 
author also refers to article 1382 C.N. In French law, slight negligence is sufficient: 
ibid., at p. 196. See also pp. 190 and 213 n. 54 for similar liabilities in German civil 
law. The author also expresses the view that there is no case directly dealing with 
prospectuses in French law on this point: ibid., at p. 197. Since the writing of the book, 
the French courts have not examined the question in this precise context. 
178. Supra n. 165. 
179. Supra n. 176. 
180. Banque populaire industrielle et commerciale de la Région de Paris et Chambre Syn-
dicale des banques c. Saint-Cizi-Castan 21 juin 1937, D.P. 1.28 with a note by P. 
Mimin at pp. 28-31 is a remarkably similar situation to that of the Hedley Byrne case. 
181. J. J. Beauchamp, Répertoire général de jurisprudence canadienne vol. 3, Wilson & 
Lafleur, Montréal, 1914-15, at pp. 2036-2038. A. Nadeau, Traité pratique de la 
responsabilité civile délictuelle, Wilson & Lafleur, Montréal, 1971, at p. 264 par. 248. 
182. (1890) 18 S.C.R. 222; (1889) 5 M.L.R. 42 (Q.B.). 
183. Ibid., at p. 241 per Ritchie, C. J. 
184. Ibid., at p. 247. 
185. Ibid., at p. 251, referring to Laurent, op. cit., vol. 20, at p. 512. 
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Other cases had already admitted the principle consecrated by the 
Supreme Court: a negligent statement in civil law will give rise to liability 
under the general principles of the Code186. In the context of contracts to 
take up shares, a similar position has been accepted by the provincial 
Court of Appeal in the case of Cloutier v. Dion187. The Court held that in 
questions of liability arising from statements made to purchasers of 
shares, French law was to provide the guidelines and referred as authority 
for its decision in that case to French jurisprudence'88. In the French case 
referred to by the Court of Appeal, it was held that: 
" . . . l'imprudente légèreté d'affirmations aussi précises, aussi formelles, suf-
firait à engager sa responsabilité envers les souscripteurs. . ." ,89. 
As a conclusion, in Quebec, there is a long line of authorities agre-
eing with the principle that negligent statements give rise to liability under 
article 1053 C.c. This approach indicates the exceptional position of 
Quebec law: in matters of contract and tort, the authorities of English law 
should be received with great caution'90 for they are based on a system of 
law so foreign to the economy of civil law that their reception cannot be 
admitted in the Province. 
If there is a liability resulting from negligent statements in Quebec 
under article 1053 C.c , this entails interesting consequences. If the 
statement is made by a representative of the company, the company is 
also liable under the principles of mandate and vicarious liability: a com-
pany can be sued for the negligent act of its agents in Quebec law and 
there is no reason to refuse to admit this rule in the context of a prospec-
tus'91. The same reasoning applies under this heading as in the case of 
fraudulent statements: every person who suffers a damage resulting from 
186. Carsley v. The Bradstreet Co., (1886) 2 M.L.R. 33 (S.C.) where Loranger, J., at p. 39 
said: " . . . it has been properly said that the French law must apply. . ." Also: ibid., at 
pp. 46 and 50. This was affirmed in appeal: (1887) 3 M.L.R. 83 (Q.B.). 
187. [1954] Que. Q.B. 595. 
188. Ibid., ax p. 603per Pratte, J., referring to: S. 1882.1.311. 
189. Ibid., at p. 311. See also: Giguère, op. cit., at pp. 172-174 where the author points to 
the basically different nature of civil and common law liability in the field of prospectus 
statements. Commenting on the English legislation, Professor Giguère remarks: 
"On ne trouve, ni en droit français ni en droit québécois, l'organisation d'une sem-
blable responsabilité qui. . . paraît avoir été manifestement édictée par suite d'une 
insuffisance de la "common law". . . {ibid.. at p. 174)) 
190. Nadeau, op. cit., at p. 12 par. 19; Desrosiers v. The King, (1920) 60 S.C.R. 105 at 
p. 126 where the Supreme Court itself warns against such an influence. 
191. This was the reasoning applied in the case of fraudulent statements. Fraud and negli-
gence being both delicts fall under the same rules. In Quebec, a company can be liable 
for the negligent act of its representatives: Ward v. The Montreal Cold Storage and 
Freezing Co., (1904) 26Que. S.C. 310(C.R.)at pp. 338-340; Smith et Renaud, op. cit., 
vol. I at pp. 384-387. 
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the statement has a right of action192 but he has the burden of establishing 
the causal link between fault and damage193. 
In Quebec law, the only recourse given at law for a negligent state-
ment will be damages: the shareholder cannot obtain rescission of his 
contract. As pointed out by Cross, J., in Bergeron v. La Compagnie de 
meubles de Jonquière194, 
" . . . misrepresentation, not amounting to fraud, has not been made a ground of 
rescission here, as it has been in England. . ."I95. 
This last rule, however, must now be stated with some qualifications. The 
provincial Securities Act does give a right of rescission where a person 
commits the following offence: 
" . . . upon the occasion of a dangerously hazardous speculative transaction 
respecting securities, to abuse the credulity, ignorance, weakness or manifest 
inexperience in business of a person incapable of estimating the risk involved in 
the transaction, and so to cause him serious prejudice. . . "" 6 . 
If a prospectus is issued and contains a negligent statement, it could 
be argued, in favour of the purchaser, that this constitutes an infringement 
of the Securities Act and entitles the party to rescission of his contract197. 
In fact, the Securities Act seems to impose an even greater standard 
of care than article 1053 C.c: from the formulation of s. 35 g of the Act, it 
would appear that not only a negligent representation gives right to relief 
but that all types of statements creating confusion in the purchaser's mind 
are also prohibited by the Act. Thus, where at civil law, mere gratis dicta 
have never given a party to a contract any rights against the person 
making them198, it would appear, under the Securities Act, that even this 
192. Supra n. 87. 
193. Supra n. 97. 
194. (1913) 22 Que. K..B. 341. 
195. Ibid., at p. 348; Wegenast, op. cit., at p. 732 n. 4. 
196. R.S.Q. 1964, c. 274, s. 35 g. 
197. The right of rescission is given by article 60 of the Act but certain conditions are set 
out in article 60 for the exercise of the right of rescission: there must be serious 
prejudice and the action must be brought within one year of the date of the transaction. 
This limits considerably the right of the aggrieved party but when one considers that at 
civil law he would have no recourse at all, this is probably a reasonable delay. For an 
interesting case dealing with s. 35 g of the Act, see: Mines v. Calumet Investments 
Ltd., [\959] Que. S.C. 455. 
198. As established previously, dolus bonus is not a cause of nullity in civil law and does not 
even give rise to damages. Thus, as Baudouin remarks: "II est impossible en effet, 
pour la nécessité des affaires de commerce, d'aller jusqu'à protéger la crédulité naïve 
des acheteurs. . .", in Les Obligations, at p. 80 n. 130. Contrast this with s. 35 g 
which makes it an offence "to abuse the credulity. . ." of an investor who is inexperi-
enced. 
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type of statement is now prohibited. This question will be examined in 
greater detail later on. 
C.. S T A T E M E N T S I N A P R O S P E C T U S N O T A M O U N T I N G T O F R A U D O R N E G -
L I G E N C E : REMEDIES IN THE LAW OF CONTRACT. 
A prospectus might contain references to future facts or statements 
of intention made by the company or its representatives. Such promises 
do not amount to fraud'99 unless of course the plaintiff can establish that 
they are made without any belief in their veracity200. A plaintiff in Quebec 
law has no recourse in nullity for such representations: he might however 
have a recourse in damages. In English law, some authority admits the 
possibility that a subscriber might sue in damages for promises that are 
not executed201. In Quebec, there is very little authority on this point but 
various dicta suggest the possibility of an action in damages in cases 
where representations of future conduct, promises and other assurances 
have not been executed202. In such cases, the rule of article 1065 C.c. 
governing contractual relief will be applicable203. 
The remedies available to the investor at civil law for mis-statements 
in a prospectus are thus numerous. The most striking feature of Quebec 
law in this context is that the principles of civil responsibility offer a wide 
range of relief when contrasted with English law. This partially explains 
199. Bergeron v. La Cie des meubles de Jonquière, supra n. 194 at pp. 342-343, 348 and 
351-352. Note that proof that such promises were made might help to establish fraud: 
ibid., at p. 345. 
200. Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 80 n. 185 where the author argues that future promises might 
be fraudulent if made without any belief in their truth. They might also amount to 
negligence if the person making such references does so negligently. See also: Penning-
ton, The investor and the law, at p. 181; Stiebel, op. cit., vol. I at pp. 146 and 168. 
201. Gower, op. cit., at p. 329. The author however points out that rescission might be 
necessary in view of the principle set out in the Houldsworth case, supra n. 149. 
202. A possibility admitted clearly by Cross, J., in the Bergeron case, supra n. 194 at 
p. 343: ". . . he nonetheless becomes a shareholder, and must be taken to rely upon 
the good faith or the legal obligation of those in control to see that these conditions are 
observed or fulfilled. . ." Such legal obligation gives rise to damages if not respected: 
T.W. Hand Fireworks v. Baikie, (1913) 43 Que. S.C. 325 (C.R.) at p. 329 where a 
recourse in damages is stated as the relief afforded in cases of promises that are not 
executed. In Quebec law, rescission is not possible for such promises: supra n. 195, 
unless one sues for the nullity of contract under failure of consideration. This last case 
will be exceptional for one rarely sees a prospectus where a representation of future 
promises can actually have been the main consideration of a contract to take up 
shares. See Gower, op. cit., at p. 329. 
203. For an exposition of the ramifications of this rule, see Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 279 and 
following. 
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the absence in the corporate legislations of any special enactment regulat-
ing declarations in prospectuses and points to interesting differences that 
must be taken into account when one is called upon to analyse, in Quebec 
law, the relationships between the company and investors on the open 
market. 
Although the protection of civil law is considerable in this context, it 
was not sufficient in many cases to deal with the ingenuity of company 
promoters whose experience of the share markets was often a precious 
tool in evading the standards set by the traditional rules of the Civil Code. 
In this last section, a brief study of the various statutes dealing with 
prospectuses in Quebec will illustrate the particular care taken by the 
provincial courts and the Legislature in ensuring that the average investor 
in the Province is guarded against all forms of promotional abuse. 
PART II 
Protecting the investor in Quebec law: judicial surveillance and statutory 
relief. 
A. THE ROLE OF THE COURTS: PROTECTOR OF INVESTORS RIGHTS 
Before examining in some detail the various provincial statutes that 
have given supplementary relief to the investor in cases where the civil 
law offered no remedies, it is of interest to study the position of the courts 
in Quebec. Prospectus liability is a good illustration of the general pro-
blem of investor protection: the attitude of the provincial Courts to the 
plight of the investor in the nineteenth century and in a contemporary 
context reveals a constant willingness to protect the innocent purchaser 
against the artifices of speculators. 
In the nineteenth century, the Courts of the Province took a surpris-
ingly protective attitude towards the investing public: although the in-
terests of commerce were a major preoccupation of the times204, Quebec 
courts often stressed the fact that they would do all in their power to 
favour the much abused investor. As pointed out by Aylwin, J., in 
Prévost v. Allaire20S, 
". . . it is fitting that the public should know that there is a tribunal which can 
control individuals in their management of such a concern. . ."206. 
204. McDougall v. Deniers, (1886) 2 M.L.R. 170 (Q.B.) at p. 183. See also Belleau v. 
Lagueux, (1904) 25 Que. S.C. 91 at p. 93 where Routhier, J., pointed to the inherent 
difficulty of reconciling the interests of commerce with the protection of investors. 
205. (1861) 11 L.C.R. 293 (Q.B.). 
206. Ibid., a. p. 321. 
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Thus, the provincial courts of the period often mentioned that it was 
their duty to protect the naive public from abuse207. However, in doing 
so, they had to respect the limitations of civil law: where the law imposed 
no liability for a particular course of conduct, it was not the office of the 
Courts to correct what they considered an abuse by an exceptional con-
struction of the Code208 and courts soon felt that they were powerless to 
deal with many of the problems involving speculation and share 
flotations209. It thus became apparent that the only solution to the pro-
blem of investment protection had to be legislative. As pointed out by 
Hall, J., in his admirable dissent in the Forget v. Ostigny case210: 
". . . speculation. . . almost always results. . . in serious ultimate loss to the 
novice who attempts it. We couple such transactions most naturally with the 
purchase and sale of stocks, because of the daily public quotations of their value 
and the facility of transferring the certificates by which they are represented. It is 
possible that by reason of the greater temptation in connection with this class of 
security, special legislation should be enacted in the interest of those who have 
not judgment and prudence for their own protection, to impose special condi-
tions upon civil contracts for the sale of stocks, instead of leaving them, as the 
legislature has thus far done, to be determined by those general principles under 
which ordinary commercial contracts are governed. . . " 2" . 
The solution to most problems dealing with the protection of inves-
tors thus had to be statutory: this general statement of Hall, J., was not 
the first time212 nor the last213 that courts of the Province suggested 
207. Côté v. The Stadacona Insurance Co., (1880) 6 Q.L.R. 147 (Q.B.) at p. 151; Syme v. 
Heward, (1856) 5 R.J.R.Q. 373 (S.C.) at p. 391. 
208. The duty of the court is to apply the law as it is and not as it should be: Abbott v. 
Fraser, (1874) 20 L.C.J. 197 (P.C.) in the Court of Appeal at p. 201. 
209. Forget v. Ostigny, (1895) 4 Que. Q.B. 118 at pp. 160-161, and more precisely at p. 161: 
" . . . t h e courts should hesitate to undertake a task in which those have signally failed 
to whom it legitimately belongs. There is great danger that the laudable effort to reach 
special cases may intimidate the use of capital and check the spirit of enterprise upon 
which the progress and prosperity of the country depend." (per Hall, J., diss.). See 
also: McDougall v. Demers, supra n. 204, at p. 175. 
210. Supra note 209. This case went to the Privy Council on appeal: [1895] A.C. 318 and 
became the locus classicus on the legitimacy of speculation. On the historical evolu-
tion in Quebec of this question: see Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II at pp. 527-543. 
211. Ibid., at p. 155. See also at pp. 160-161, wher the learned judge discussed the useful-
ness of making "men prudent by statute" (at p. 161). 
212. See McDougall v. Demers, supra n. 204 at p. 175 for an earlier example. 
213. The Courts have probably been the best Company Law Reform body in the Province. 
There are numerous examples where the courts have pointed to certain shortcomings 
of the provincial legislation in this field and have suggested appropriate amendments. 
See, for example: Société des arts du Canada v. Prévost, (1911) 20 Que. K.B. 227, at 
pp. 235-236 where the Court suggested that tontines should be regulated by statute. 
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adequate legislation in this field of commerce, pointing to the inade-
quacies of civil law to cope with modern problems of issuing techniques, 
company promotions and share flotations. 
Of late, the Courts have not abandoned their function of corporate 
"ombudsman": in a recent case, for exemple, the tribunal stated that its 
primary consideration in questions of share dealings was always the pro-
tection of the public, even if this was to be detrimental to commercial 
interests214. 
In a sense, the Courts in Quebec were instrumental in bringing about 
important reforms in the laws governing share dealings: our modern sta-
tutes are due to their sincere preoccupation in seeking some form of relief 
for the much oppressed investor of the last one hundred and fifty years. 
As regards the question of prospectus liability, two statutes have some 
bearing on the present discussion. They are the Companies Information 
Act215 and the Securities Act116. These will be discussed separately. 
B. STATUTORY RELIEF FOR THE AGGRIEVED INVESTOR 
1. The Companies Information Act 
The first legislative attempt in Quebec to control the qualitative con-
tents of a prospectus was to be the Companies Information Act, enacted 
in 1930 and modelled on an Ontario statute of 1928217. The Act was 
amended from time to time218 but in essence, it has not changed much 
over the years. The Act imposes an obligation on company promoters 
and directors to deposit with the Minister of Consumer Affairs a prospec-
For the regulation of such agreements in French law, see: C. Houpin et H. Bosvieux, 
Traité general théorique et pratique des sociétés civiles et commerciales, vol. 2,7th ed., 
Administration du Journal des notaires et des avocats, Paris, 1935, at pp. 1122 and fol-
lowing; Black v. Carson, (1913) 22 Que. K.B. 217 p. at p. 219 where provisions 
regarding compulsory take-over bids were suggested and enacted fifty years later: S. Q. 
1963, c. 54, s. 1. A more recent example is Mines v. Calumet Investmenss Ltd, supra 
n. 197 at pp. 459-460 suggesting the controlling of over-the-counter sales of specula-
tive shares by appropriate legislation: this was partly carried out by the Revised Policy 
Statement n. 5 prepared by the Securities Commission of the province in March 
1974. 
214. Mines v. Calumet Investmenss Ltd, supra n. 197 at p. 463. 
215. R.S.Q. 1964, c.273. [Hereinafter, referred to as the Companies Informaiion Act.] 
216. R.S.Q. 1964, c. 274. [Hereinafter, referred to as the Securities Act.] 
217. The statute was enacted by (1930) 20 Geo. V, c. 87. It was modelled on the Ontario 
Act: (1928) 18 Geo. V, c. 33. See Wegenast, op. cit., at pp. 696-693 for the historical 
outline of these Acts. 
218. The most recent amendments being: S.Q. 1974, c. 66; S.Q. 1975, c. 74. 
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tus whenever a company is about to establish an office in the Province, 
commence business or sell any of its shares therein219. There is a statu-
tory liability imposed for failing to do what the statute prescribes220 but 
although the Act clearly sets out the information that the prospectus must 
contain, it imposes no liability for false or negligent statements made in 
the document221. Thus, the Quebec legislature attempts to control the 
issue of shares in the province by requiring a prospectus to be delivered to 
the provincial authorities but it leaves to the general principles of civil 
law the control of illegalities committed in the preparation of such a 
document. 
2. The Securities Act 
Legislative control of the securities industry in Quebec was attemp-
ted at various stages during the decade preceding 1930222 but it was only 
with the passing of an Act for the prevention of fraud in connection with 
securities21* that proper regulation of investment contracts appeared in 
the Province. The statute was modelled on what is commonly known as 
the Martin Act of the State of New York224 and contained basically the 
same provisions. It is beyond the scope of this article to examine in full 
detail the structure of our modern Securities Act225 but as it has some 
relevance to the question of prospectus liability, an examination of certain 
parts of the law is necessary. 
219. Supra n. 215, s. 2. Note s. 2(c) requiring a new prospectus to be filed whenever 
there have been material changes in the fact set out in a previously deposited prospec-
tus. The same obligation is imposed by the Regulations made under the Securities Act: 
O.C. 2745-73, Que. Reg. 73-417, as amended by O.C. 3963-73, Que. Reg. 73-550; O.C. 
1260-74, Que. Reg.74-172, in section 7 of said Regulations [hereinafter referred to as 
Regulations]. 
220. Ibid., at s. 3. 
221. Strangely enough, the Act imposes such liability for a false statement in an annual 
return: ibid., s. 4(3) and (3a) but the case of a prospectus is not covered. See also: J. P. 
Williamson, Securities regulation in Canada, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 
1960, at pp. 39, 83-84 (Suppl.\966). 
222. Various statutes were enacted to control the sale of securities in the Province. See: An 
Act respecting the issue and sale of shares, bonds and other securities, ( 1924) 14 Geo. 
V, c. 64. Control of brokers was also attempted: An Act to amend the Quebec License 
Act, (1928) 18 Geo. V, c. 14. For the historical context of those statutes: Williamson, 
op. cit., at pp. 11-14 and more particularly at p. 13. 
223. (1930) 20 Geo. V, c. 88. 
224. Wegenast, op. cit., at p. 693 n. 19 and p. 699. The New York Act was passed in 
1921: L. Loss and E. M. Cowett, Blue Sky Law, Little, Brown, Boston, 1958, at p. 22. 
For a discussion of the statute, see L. Loss, Securities regulation, vol. 1, 2nd ed., 
Little, Brown, Boston, 1961, (Suppl. 1969)) at pp. 35-43. 
225. For a good analysis of the statute: Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. il at pp. 1123-1253. 
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Like other statutes of the province dealing with securities, the Act 
contains no express liability section for false or misleading statements in a 
prospectus226. Curiously enough, the provincial legislature seems to cons-
tantly avoid having to deal with this issue, although recent amendments in 
other fields of company legislation reveal a greater willingness to cope 
with the problem227. The Act, however, does contain rather curious fea-
tures that are not wholly foreign to the present discussion. 
a. A statutory definition of fraud 
In a long and detailed section, the Securities Act declares that certain 
representations and forms of conduct are fraudulent acts "within the 
meaning of this Act"228. A question of interpretation immediately arises 
concerning this section: was it the Legislator's intention to extend the 
definition of civil law fraud to cover cases not admitted by the ordinary 
principles of law? If this were so, the remedies examined above would in 
every case contemplated by s. 35 be available to the purchaser229. Or is 
the section simply a statutory definition of conduct that was to be consi-
dered undesirable in transactions involving share dealings and subject to 
either the sanctions of the Act itself or the pressures of administrative 
action? 
Since the enactment of the statute, commentators have wondered 
whether the section does indeed give rise to the ordinary rules of civil 
226. Although it does deal extensively with the information that must be set out in a pros-
pectus: s. 5 of the Regulations and Annex "A"; Renaud et Smith, ibid., at 
pp. 1202-1222. 
227. In the case of false or misleading statements in documents required in take-over bid 
and insider trading legislation, it is now an offence under the Act to make such state-
ments: see the recent amendments to the Securities Act enacted in 1973 by S.Q. 1973, 
c. 67 adding ss. 137, 138 and ss. 160, 161. The sections create a presumption of 
knowledge on the part of the person making the statement that it was false or mislead-
ing unless he can establish that he had reasonable cause to believe it. This is the first 
appearance in the statute books of a legislation of the type of the Directors Liability 
Act passed in England after the Derry v. Peek case: see supra note 161 and following. 
Is this necessary? As pointed out above, negligent statements in civil law give rise to 
liability under the general principles of civil law responsibility. The only advantage of 
such legislation is the presumption created by statute: this, however, is possibly 
created in civil law by simple judiciary discretion. Vide Trudel, op. cit., at p. 187; 
Chrétien v. Crowley, (1882) 2 D.C.A. 385 (Q.B.), at p. 389 and articles 1238 and 1242 
C.c. Consequently, in civil law, legislation of the type created by the 1973 amendments 
appears to be duplicative of the common law of the Province. 
228. Securities Act, s. 35. 
229. If this interpretation were to prevail, a right of rescission and an action in damages 
would be available for every case of "fraud" contemplated by section 35. 
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law230. One can most probably conclude that the legislative intent in this 
instance was not to extend the remedies of civil law to cases enumerated 
in the section but to simply proscribe certain conduct and leave it to the 
persons charged with administering the statute to see that offenders be 
dealt with. Reasons for this conclusion are numerous. First of all, in 
the New York statute from which the provincial Act was copied231, there 
is a similar section: commentators of American law suggest that such a 
section was merely intended as a basis for investigation and proper ad-
ministrative action rather than common law liability232. The administra-
tive nature of the Quebec section was very clearly set out in the original 
1930 Act: wide powers of investigation were given to the Attorney Gen-
eral to determine whether a fraudulent act had been committed233 and if it 
had, the consequence was that the person involved in the commission of 
the act was to be restrained from dealing in securities in the Province234. 
230. Wegenast, op. cit., at p. 697. More recently: Y. Caron, "Aspects du droit des valeurs 
mobilières", (1971) 17 McGill L. J. 234 at p. 287, where the author notes the complete 
absence of jurisprudence on this point, a view that is however erroneous. See infra 
note 238. 
231. Supra note 224. 
232. Ibid. Vide Loss, supra note 224, vol. I at p. 40. See also: Williamson, op. cit., at 
pp. 357-358. 
American law is not very useful in the interpretation of the Quebec Securities Act. The 
basic liability sections in the Securities Act of 1933 [48 Stat. 74 (1933), 15 U.S.C.A. 77] 
were modelled very closely on English law: Loss, op. cit., vol. 3, at p. 1683; R.R. 
Pennington, The investor and the law, at p. 194. 
Most cases of liability for false statements are taken under sections 11 and 12 of the 
Securities Act, 1933. The classic case is now Escott v. Bar Chris Construction Corpo-
ration, 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N. Y. .968) but that was a case mainly brought under s. 11 
of the Act, and there is no equivalent in Quebec to such a section. See also: E. R. Latty, 
"Prospectus Liability—The Bar Chris Case", [1970] J.B.L. 65. 
Some American authorities also suggest implied liability under Rule 10b-5 [17 C.F.R. 
240.10b-5 (1970)] for misstatements in a prospectus. Generally: "Prospectus Liability 
and Rule 10b-5: A Sequel to Bar Chris", [1971] Duke L.J. 559 (Note). However, under 
the Quebec Act, there is also no equivalent rule or regulation of the Securities Commis-
sion. Consequently, the rather complicated decisions of American courts in this respect 
cannot serve in the interpretation of our Securities Act. On American law, see also 
Expanding responsibilities under the securities laws (S. C. Goldberg, ed.), Law 
Journal Press, New York, 1971. 
233. In the 1930 Act, supra note 223, the fraud definition was set out in s. 2, which was the 
interpretation section: s. 2(3). The investigation section was s. 10 which read as fol-
lows: "The Attorney-General. . . may hold an investigation and examine any person, 
company or thing whatsoever at any time in order to ascertain whether any fraudulent 
act. . . has been, or is about to be committed. . ." 
234. The consequences of a finding that a fraudulent act had been committed were that the 
Attorney-General could prevent a person from dealing in securities for a period of ten 
days or ask the Superior Court for a permanent injunction and give public notice of the 
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The purpose of securities legislation of this type thus becomes clear: by 
controlling securities dealers in the province, it is much easier to control 
the share market and ensure standards acceptable to all235. The modern 
Securities Act is slightly altered in that it does not expressly set out the 
consequence of committing a fraudulent act within the meaning of 
s. 35236. However, the Securities Commission still has complete dis-
cretion in deciding whether a registration will be granted to a dealer or an 
issuer and if the latter should have fallen within the application of the 
section, he most probably would be subject to the exercise of this discre-
tion: thus, registration as an issuer or dealer could either be refused or 
revoked where the Commission is satisfied after investigation that a 
fraudulent act has been committed237. 
suspension. See the 1930 statute, supra note 223, ss. 11, 12. Thus, the finding of a 
fraudulent act simply resulted in administrative sanctions of great consequence but no 
civil liability seems to have been intended. Wegenast, op. cit., at p. 696; Williamson, 
op. cit., at p. 22: ' "There was no attempt to create civil liabilities based on these 
"fraudulent" acts; they constituted offences and were punishable by fine or impris-
onment and they could be the basis for an injunction. . ." See also: ibid., at p. 23. 
235. Gregory and Co. v. La Commission des valeurs mobilières du Québec, [1961] S.C.R. 
584 at p. 590. See also: Williamson, op. cit., at p. 21. Note that the Quebec Act now 
deals with the question not only at the level of controlling securities dealers as it 
originally did in 1930 but also controls the issue of shares. See Renaud et Smith, op. 
cit., vol. II at pp. 1186-1187. 
236. Note that until the amendments of S.Q. 1959-60, s. 51, the Quebec Securities Commis-
sion had the duty to cancel the registration of a dealer or an issuer if a fraudulent act 
should be found to have been committed by an investigation. This was originally 
brought into the statute by: S.Q. 1954-55, c. l i s . 43. Vide: Williamson, op. cit., at 
pp. 229 and 235. Now, the Commission has complete discretion in the matter: R.S.Q. 
1964, c. 274, ss. 24 and 25a of the Act. 
237. Ibid. See also: Williamson, op. cit., at pp. 22, 23, 175 and 224. Note the author's 
comment at p. 175: "Like the other securities acts, the Quebec Act lists activities 
which are 'deemed fraudulent'. Probably no civil liability attaches to these activities in 
the absence of an express provision: they are offences punishable by fine or imprison-
ment, but there do not appear to have been any recoveries in civil actions based on 
them. . ." One wonders if the statute itself imposes any sanctions apart from adminis-
trative displeasure that results in suspension and cancellation of the registration. S. 35 
does not declare at any point that a violation or commission of any act therein de-
scribed constitutes an offence. Consequently, serious doubts arise in deciding whether 
such an act constitutes an offence under the statute. See: Canadian Securities Law 
Reporter, vol. I, CCH Canadian Ltd., Don Mills, 1973, at p. 616 par 627. Note how-
ever that a conspiracy and complicity in committing such acts are offences: Securities 
Act, ss. 88, 89. The reason for this rather surprising omission is either an oversight on 
the part of the draftsman or is more legalistic. The imposition of a fine or imprison-
ment for the commission of a fraudulent act would be the consequence of making such 
act an offence. This would present a difficult problem of constitutional law: criminal 
legislation is the exclusive field of the federal parliament and the provincial regulation 
on this question could be viewed as infringing upon the federal jurisdiction, Vide 
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There is almost no reported jurisprudence on this type of legislation: 
however, in one Ontario case, Re Attorney General for Ontario and 
Huteson23,, the Court was dealing with a similar section239 and came to 
the conclusion that the purpose of this legislation was to ensure that those 
dealing on the share market should not make use of abusive tactics240 and 
that the method of ensuring the application of the Act was to control the 
registration of such individuals241. In that case, the Attorney General 
sought a permanent injunction against the defendant, which the' court 
granted willingly. 
No mention is made in the course of that judgment of the possibility 
of common law recourses against those committing a fraudulent act 
within the meaning of the statute. This is a reasonable position, for surely, 
if the Legislature had intended such recourses, it would have been more 
specific. This was to be the case in Quebec. 
Thus, the statute itself gives some form of relief but only in the case 
contemplated by section 35 g which reads as follows: 
" . . . upon the occasion of a dangerously hazardous speculative transaction 
respecting securities, to abuse the credulity, ignorance, weakness or manifest 
inexperience of a person incapable of estimating the risk involved in the transac-
tion, and so to cause him serious prejudice;. . ." 
Where such an act has been committed, the purchaser has a right of 
rescission242. The case contemplated in s. 35 g is never admissible in civil 
Williamson, op. cit., at pp. 186-188. This probably explains the curious formulation of 
s. 84 of the Act which declares that "every person convicted of. . . any fraudulent act 
not punishable under the Criminal Code of Canada. . ." shall be liable to certain fines 
and/or imprisonment. But even then, how can one be convicted of a fraudulent act 
under s. 35 if such act is not an offence? Nullum crimen sine lege. Consequently, the 
Act should be amended to state clearly that a fraudulent act not punishable under the 
criminal law should be an offnece and subjected to the penalties of s. 84. On the 
constitutional issue, see Williamson, op. cit., at pp. 182-184 for supplementary mate-
rial. 
238. (1930-31) 66 O.L.R. 387. 
239. The Ontario Securities Fraud Prevention Act (1930) 18 Geo. V, c. 39, s. 12. 
240. Supra note 238 at pp. 390-391, per Kelly, J. 
241. Ibid. See however the unreported case of Johnston v. Windsor, K.B., Montreal, n. 
1888, 29 May 1942, where there is some suggestion that the statutory fraud might 
indeed have extended the ambit of civil law remedies. 
242. The right is given by s. 60 of the Act. The party must be "seriously prejudiced" and 
note that the section reserves the recourse of civil law. The right to rescission is lost 
after a year's delay. 
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law as a cause of rescission: lesion between majors243 and dolus bonus2** 
have never been valid causes of rescission under our laws. If the Legis-
lator thought it necessary to give relief in such a clear case where the civil 
law offered no recourse, is not the logical conclusion that he must have 
considered civil law recourses inapplicable to the other cases set out in 
s. 35 of the Act245? 
Thus, a fraudulent or negligent misrepresentation in a prospectus will 
certainly fall under the application of the section but it will offer little 
added relief to the investor. The sole purpose of this enactment would 
seem to be purely supervisory and to ensure that persons involved in the 
provincial securities market take all due care to act with reasonable hon-
esty in their dealings with innocent purchasers. If they should fail to do 
so, they will be prevented from trading in securities in the Province by 
administrative action. 
b. The statutory declaration 
Every prospectus must contain a signed declaration on the part of the 
promoters and directors of the issuing company in the following words: 
"The foregoing constitutes, under the Securities Act, full, true and plain disclo-
sure of all material facts in respect of the offering of the securities referred to 
243. S. 35(g) gives a right of rescission for any form of abusive conduct in share dealings. In 
civil law, there is no relief for mere abuse on the part of a contracting party: this is the 
rule of article 1001 and 1012 C.c. Only in cases of minors is abusive conduct a valid 
cause of nullity: 1002 C.c. The minor's right of action is lost after ten years: 2258 C.c. 
Thus, the right given by s. 60 is a statutory exception to the rule of article 1012 C.c: 
Baudouin, Les Obligations, at p. 95 note 157. An interesting case where a minor sued 
under s. 35(g) of the Act is: Mines v. Calumet Investments Ltd, [1959] Que. S.C. 455. 
Note that in the case of a minor, the section offers less protection than the civil law 
relief: ibid., at pp. 461-462. Under s. 35(g), the minor must fall within the one year 
delay given by s. 60, where under the Civil Code, he has ten years to sue: 2258 C.c; 
Mines case, ibid., at p. 465. Thus, curiously enough, what is considered as a fraud 
under statutory law (ibid., at pp. 462-463) is equivalent to lesion under civil law, when 
the case involves a minor. See also: N. R. Bums, "Infants as shareholders", (1955) 
28 Aust. L.J. 407. 
244. As seeen above, mere exagérations do not constitute fraud in civil law but under the 
Act, such conduct will give rise to a right of rescission: Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 80 
note 130. A right of rescission will exist if plaintiff can convince the court that the 
defendant's conduct falls within the purview of s. 35(g). This offers good possibilities 
to the investor but no case seems to have dealt with the section since the Mines case, 
supra. 
245. Unless of course the cases of s. 35 are already covered by the general principles of 
civil law applicable to fraud or negligence. See, for example, ss. 35(a), 35(b), 35(f), 
35(h). 
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above, and there is no further material information applicable other than in the 
financial statements or reports required or exigible."246 
The brokers, underwriters and optionees must also sign a similar 
declaration247. What is the effect of such a declaration? Some authorities 
consider it as a purely formal condition without any liability attached 
thereto248. This position cannot be accepted. Where such a declaration is 
made, it constitutes a representation to third parties that the statement is 
true: if it should prove false, this would incur the liability of the persons 
making it where they have acted negligently or fraudulently. As pointed 
out by Martel249: 
"Il semble qu'une personne lésée pourra se baser sur cette déclaration des 
administrateurs pour les poursuivre civilement en dommages si elle a subi une 
perte par suite d'une fausse déclaration ou d'une déclaration erronée contenue 
dans le prospectus. . ."2 5°. 
246. This obligation is imposed by s. 5(2) of the Regulations. Note that where the regula-
tion prescribes that a certain thing has to be done, it constitutes an offence under the 
Act not to follow this direction: see s. 83 of the Securities Act, in fine. Thus, if the 
directors do not sign the declaration, they will be liable to the penalties of s. 84 of the 
Act. They might also be liable in delict under article 1053 C.c. In civil law, the breach 
of statutory duties gives rise to civil law liability: Baudouin, La responsabilité civile 
délictuelle, at p. 50 note 59; H. Newman, "Breach of statute as a basis of responsibil-
ity in civil law", (1949) 27 C.B.R. 782; Williamson, op. cit., at p. 162 where the author 
states that this is "the usual rule in Quebec. . ."(ibid.); Lagueux v. Phoenix Assurance 
Co. Ltd, (1932) 53 Que. K.B. 398 at p. 407. This question is not settled in English law: 
see the discussion in Gower, op. cit., at pp. 334, 338; Williamson, op. cit., at p. 162. 
The duty is imposed by a regulation under the Act: however, see s. 83 in fine: " . . . 
These regulations and amendments to them shall have force of law while not repealed 
as if they are part of this act. . ." Thus, where the regulations state that a prospectus 
has to contain certain information, this imposes a duty on those responsible for the 
preparation of such a document to see that that information is set out in the prospec-
tus. If it is not, then they will be liable in damages under article 1053 C.c. for breach of 
duty. Note however that the normal rules of civil liability are applicable to such cases 
also: Baudouin, op. cit., at p. 51 note 59. 
247. Regulations, s. 5(2) (b). On underwriter's liability, see P. P. Côté, loc. cit., note (1), 
generally. 
248. Williamson, op. cit., at pp. 156-157. But the author concludes this because of the 
general liability sections in the statutes discussed: Quebec has no such section. Conse-
quently, his conclusion could not apply to our provincial Act. 
249. Supra note 172. 
250. Ibid., at p. 356. See also: Gower, op. cit., at pp. 292, 317 and 320. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal has recently adopted a similar position in Yulcsel Atill 
lasoy v. Crown Trust Co., [1974] Que. C.A. 442. This is the first reported case in 
Quebec to deal with investment contracts, as defined by the Securities Act: see the 
definition section in the Act, s. 1 (ll)(a) and Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II at 
pp. 1139-1142. In the case cited, a prospectus was prepared in order to inform inves-
tors as to the financial status of an investment trust that was formed to acquire a 
shopping centre. Part of the purchase price of the property was to be obtained by way 
R. DEMERS Prospectus Liability 793 
The statutory declaration also offers an element of solution to the 
question of determining what constitutes a material fact relevant to the 
issue of shares. 
As pointed out above, simple omissions in civil law do not amount to 
fraud251. Although certain exceptions do qualify the generality of this 
statement252, they are not important enough to justify the regulation of 
this question by civil law principles exclusively. 
The Securities Act of the Province deals extensively with the ques-
tion of omissions. Firstly, an omission is a fraudulent act under the 
statute253: this exposes the person making an omission to the sanctions of 
of a hypothecary loan that was to be repaid over a period of twenty years and the 
trustee was empowered to lease out the property by way of "net lease". 
The prospectus contained representations to this effect, which, however, were false. 
The loan was not for a period of twenty years but was repayable after five years only 
and the property was leased not by "net lease" but by way of emphyteusis. The 
directors of the promoting company had signed the statutory declaration required 
under the Securities Act. Dubé, J., in the Court of Appeal, commented on their 
liability. The learned judge pointed out, firstly, that the directors could not invoke the 
fact that they were simple representatives of the company in order to avoid the civil 
liability attaching to their fraudulent statements and referred to the case oiCafo Ltd v. 
Harper, [1968] Que. S.C. 235: pp. 447-448 of the judgment. 
The learned judge then came to the conclusion that defendant directors knew that the 
prospectus was false: ibid., at p. 447 and consequently " . . . les six directeurs de 
Realty Equities Company of Canada Ltd doivent être tenus personnellement 
responsables. . ." The directors not only committed a fault in such a case but also a 
fraud: ibid., at p. 448. The Court also cited as authority for this conclusion the decision 
of the Supreme Court of Canada in Nesbitt, Thomson & Co. Ltd v. Joseph M. Pigott, 
[1941] S.C.R. 520 at p. 530. Thus, the Court of Appeal found defendants liable for 
damages under the general principles of civil law and common law: ibid., at p. 448. See 
also at p. 449. 
The case presents other interesting features. The Court clearly indicated that the 
investment contract, although in the form of a trust, was to be analysed according to 
the principles of the Civil Code: ibid., at p. 449, where Dubé, J., remarked: 
"Quand au surplus de la fiducie en question qui constitue réellement une entreprise 
commerciale à but lucratif, je serais plutôt d'opinion qu'il s'agit là d'un contrat 
innommé qui doit être régi par les règles générales du Code Civil concernant les 
obligations et les contrats. . ." 
See also Bélanger, J., at p. 450, taking the same position. The Court of Appeal also 
indicated that the duties of a trustee under such an agreement were to be governed by 
the rules of trust as set out in the Civil Code: ibid.,at pp. 449 and 451, where the Court 
refers to articles 98lu and 981k C.c. The Atillasoy case is thus an excellent example of 
the tendency of the Quebec judiciary to try to assimilate the influence of common law 
to the economy of the Civil Code. 
251. Supra note 15. 
252. Supra note 16. 
253. Ss. 35(a) and (j) of the Act. 
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administrative action examined above254. The Regulations under the 
Act255 describe in considerable detail the information that is required to 
be set out in any prospectus issued in the Province: there is the pre-
cise duty to declare all material contracts256 and all material facts2" that 
are relevant to the issue of shares. 
What sanctions attach to a failure to respect these statutory direc-
tives? 
i) An action in damages under article 1053 C.c. for breach of a 
statutory duty could be available to any person who suffers damages 
resulting from this omission258. 
ii) An action in damages under article 1053 C.c. for fraud and/or 
negligence: the statutory declaration259 contains a representation that all 
material facts are contained in the prospectus. Where this is false, the 
normal rules concerning misrepresentations in civil law come into play. 
iii) An action in nullity of the contract: 
This appears to be possible under common law260. In civil law, pro-
hibitive laws import nullity, even where this is not specified in the 
statute261. It seems that in Quebec, where the Legislature has indicated 
that certain information must be given to a contracting party, the fact that 
254. Supra note 237. 
255. Regulations, s. 5(l)(a) and Annex "A". 
256. Ibid., s. 27 of Annex "A". See Wegenast, op. cit., at pp. 705-706. The only case in 
Quebec dealing with material contracts is Lefebvre v. Prouty, (1918) 54 Que. S.C. 490 
but it is of limited interest. It dealt with the interpretation of s. 43 of the Dominion 
Companies Act, R.S.C. 1906, c. 79. For an analysis of that type of legislation, see: 
Stiebel, op. cit., vol. I at pp. 146-147. Compare with a modem equivalent: Wegenast, 
op. cit., at pp. 705-706; Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II at pp. 1202 and 1216. The 
"materiality" concept is not an easy one to apply for " . . . what is material to one man 
may be immaterial to another. . .": Stiebel, ibid., at p. 147 note k. See also Yuksel 
Atillasoy v. Crown Trust Company, supra note 250 at p. 447 where Dubé, J., quotes 
from the Superior Court judgment rendered by Nolan, J., 
"There can be no doubt that if Defendants had been considering purchasing this 
property with their own money at risk, the terms of the hypothec would have been a 
serious factor in any decision they reached. . ." 
See also Côté, loc. cit., note (1), at pp. 157-158, and 165 and following. 
257. Ibid., s. 33. 
258. Supra, note 246. See also: Wegenast, op. cit., at p. 719. Gower, op. cit., at 
pp. 334-335. Generally: G. Williams, "The effect of penal legislation in the law of 
tort", (1960) 23 M.L.R. 233; L. Loss, "The fiduciary concept as applied to trading by 
corporate insiders in the United States", (1970) 33 M.L.R. 34, at p. 43. 
259. Supra note 246. 
260. Wegenast, op. cit., at p. 719. 
261. Article 14 C.c. See also, infra, note 264. 
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this was not done might give that party a right to ask for the nullity of the 
contract: this nullity would be merely relative and not absolute262. 
Thus, the Securities Act offers considerable possibilities to the inves-
tor in cases of omissions, taking over where the civil law generally failed 
because of its restrictions. 
The Securities Act of the Province deals extensively with the ques-
tion of the contents of a prospectus and sets out the numerous details that 
must be given to the purchaser of shares263: this complex regulation how-
ever does not deal with civil liabilities arising out of false or negligent 
statements made by promoters and directors in the preparation of such 
documents. Although the Securities Act sometimes offers relief where the 
civil law would be without protection for the abused investor264, as a 
general rule the Legislature of the Province seems to have considered that 
the rules of civil law were sufficiently adequate to afford enough remedies 
for most cases involving deceptive practices in corporate financing, with-
out having to deal with this question statutorily. 
262. Is the contract to take up shares in a company now a contract uberrimae fidei? See 
supra note 22. 
263. The Securities Act, s. 53, declares that a prospectus must give "a full disclosure of 
relevant facts. . ." 
264. As in the case of lesion which is not normally a cause of nullity in civil law: supra, note 
243. The Act also imposes the duty of preparing a prospectus each time an issue of 
shares is contemplated: s. 53. The prospectus is examined by the Commission and 
then permission is granted to distribute it generally: ibid. A copy of every prospectus 
must be given to each purchaser of shares: ibid. But quaere, what if a prospectus is not 
given to a purchaser? The Act states that this constitutes an offence: s. 53. It also 
could give rise to a civil law liability under article 1053 C.c. for non-compliance: supra 
note 246. Could the purchaser sue for the nullity of his contract? This is a question that 
is "not free from doubt": Fraser and Stewart, op. cit., at p. 482. Common law pro-
vinces in Canada seem to be divided on the issue: see Williamson, op. cit., at 
pp. 163-167 for an extensive review of the authorities and a conclusion that most 
probably the contract is voidable in favour of the purchaser. However, recent cases 
seem to suggest that the contract subsists and that only the penalties imposed by the 
statute are to be applied in cases of non-compliance: S. Beck in (1974) 52 C.B.R. 589 
where the author criticizes the view adopted in Ames et al. v. Investo-Plan Ltd & al., 
(1973) 35 D.L.R. (3d.) 613 (B.C.C.A.) and suggests that the contract should also be 
voidable at the purchaser's option: ibid., at p. 597. In Quebec, the rule is simpler: a 
contract that does not respect statutory conditions is made voidable at the option of the 
person for whom the legislative safeguards were intended. Thus, the jurisprudence 
of the Court of Appeal has always considered that a relative nullity exists in the case 
where a prospectus is not given to the purchaser: Renaud et Smith, op. cit., vol. II at 
pp. 1189-1190 for a review of the cases on the subject. See also: article 14C.c.;s. 93 of 
the Securities Act. 
796 Les Cahiers de Droit (1977) 18 c. de D. .45 
CONCLUSION 
Prospectus liability in Quebec law presents highly interesting fea-
tures. As a general rule, one might conclude that most cases of fraud and 
negligence in this context are dealt with by reference to the rules of civil 
law. However, the great similarity between common and civil law on such 
questions was to have important consequences in Quebec: the courts did 
not hesitate to refer in many instances to precedents of common law to 
decide technical questions of civil law liability. English law was also 
resorted to in cases where more equitable results were sought26S or where 
the courts wished to create harmony in the rules of company law through-
out Canada266. 
The discussion on negligent statements in a prospectus indicated 
however the limits of the English influence: although statutory relief for 
such statements has existed in common law jurisdictions since 1900, no 
equivalent is to be found in the provincial statutes dealing with investor 
protection. As we have seen, the rules of civil law in this context were 
much wider than those of common law and this would appear to be the 
only rational explanation for the absence of similar legislation in the sta-
tute books. Thus, even if modern securities legislation in Quebec was 
copied from Anglo-American models, it remains subject to the more ge-
neral rules of civil law where questions of delictual liability arise. 
In the field of capital investments, one can thus detect the persistent 
influence of English law in the numerous references to common law pre-
cedents and the enactment of statutes inspired from the Anglo-American 
tradition. However, the reception of English law had clear limits and one 
finds that, as a rule, the Legislator and the jurisprudence have indicated 
that the civil law was to ultimately govern the application of such statutes 
by refusing to import into the Province principles incompatible with the 
economy of the Civil Code. 
265. In Rhodes v. Starnes, supra note 15, English law was invoked in order to avoid 
imposing upon directors a liability ad infinitum for their false or negligent statements. 
266. Supra note 9. 
